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ASSESSING THE RELEVANCY AND EFFICACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi ∗
ABSTRACT
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (adopted in 2003)
is the first global in-depth treaty on corruption. This work attempts to assess
its significance by analyzing its provisions, in particular, those concerning the
areas of prevention, criminalization, and asset recovery. It then seeks to assess
its relevancy and effectiveness by giving an overview of the UNCAC’s main
compliance challenges, as well as other existing initiatives that tackle
corruption. Two types of compliance challenges are suggested throughout this
work: direct and indirect compliance challenges. Among direct compliance
challenges are the treaty’s language, the existence of sanctions, and its
monitoring mechanism. Indirect compliance challenges on the other hand
include good governance and prosecution difficulties. Although the UNCAC
innovates in many respects, it is argued that it also suffers from weaknesses
that cannot be overlooked, preventing it from having a real impact on States’
behavior.
INTRODUCTION
“Little did we suspect that our own people . . . would be as corrupt as the
apartheid regime.” 1
“Corruption” stems from the Latin word corruptus, meaning “to
break.” 2 Although corruption is a difficult concept to define, it is widely
assimilated to “the abuse of public office for private gain.” 3 It is argued that to
even attempt to define a vast concept such as corruption will inevitably
∗

The author holds an LL.M. in International Law and an LL.B. from the University of
Montreal. She has worked as an intern for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in
Vienna and is currently practicing law as a Crown Prosecutor for the Bureau de lutte aux
produits de la criminalité (Proceeds of Crime Office, within the office of the Director of
Criminal and Penal Prosecutions), prosecuting white-collar crime and organized crime cases.
1
See ROBERT GUEST, THE SHACKLED CONTINENT 232 (2005) (citing A Sense of Hope,
MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (March 2, 2001), http://madiba.mg.co.za/article/2001-03-02-asense-of-hope).
2
See COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 1 (2006).
3
See James W. Williams & Margaret E. Beare, The Business of Bribery: Globalization,
Economic Liberalization, and the ‘Problem’ of Corruption, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND CORRUPTION 88, 117 n.3
(2003).
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encounter legal and political difficulties, and that defining specific types of
corruption offers less challenges. 4
The United Nations considers this issue by offering a “multi-layered” 5
definition of corruption in its Anti-Corruption Toolkit. 6 According to the UN,
the more common types of corruption are grand corruption, petty corruption,
passive and active corruption. Whereas petty corruption often refers to an
exchange of small amounts of money or minor favors (such as grease or
facilitation payments), grand corruption involves high-ranking officials and is
“distinguished by the scale of wealth appropriated and the seniority of public
officials involved.” 7 The following passage differentiates between both types
of corruption: “The most critical difference between grand corruption and petty
corruption is that the former involves the distortion or corruption of the central
functions of Government, while the latter develops and exists within the
context of established governance and social frameworks.” 8
Active and passive corruption are used often to refer to the offer or
acceptance of a bribe. 9 Although corruption is universally considered
reprehensible and is criminalized around the world, 10 difficulties remain in the
lack of a consensus in defining corrupt behavior. 11 Extrapolating on this
argument, it is suggested that “while all cultures eschew corruption, culture
remains a critical differentiator as opinions vary on what conduct falls inside
and outside of that label.” 12 In other words, what may be considered an
improper transaction in one country may be acceptable in another. In order to
successfully create a consensus among varying state opinions, international
treaties must consider the many possible definitions of corruption. 13
4

See Nicholas A. Goodling, Nigeria’s Crisis of Corruption—Can the U.N. Global
Programme Hope to Resolve this Dilemma?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 997, 1001 (2003).
5
See id. at 1002.
6
See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, The Global Programme Against Corruption, U.N.
Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 10–17, (Sept. 2004), http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/
publications_toolkit_sep04.pdf, [hereinafter UNODC Anti-Corruption Toolkit].
7
Simeon A. Igbinedion, A Critical Appraisal of the Mechanism for Prosecuting Grand
Corruption Offenders Under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 6
MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 56, 58 (2009).
8
UNODC Anti-Corruption Toolkit, supra note 6, at 10–11.
9
See id. at 11.
10
See Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 627, 629 (2000).
11
See Stephen R. Salbu, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony,
20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 423 (1999); Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A
Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks and
Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption
Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 547, 554 (2000).
12
Salbu, supra note 11, at 423; George & Lacey, supra note 11, at 555. The existence of
this divergence is even said to have fuelled a “symbiotic relationship” often arising between
developing and industrialized countries, whereby the latter profit from corrupt transactions.
13
See Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Difference in the Crusade Against
International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses In Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 549, 557 (1997).
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Corruption is more and more perceived as a cause of underdevelopment
and poverty: “[c]orruption is now seen as a cause of poverty, not merely a
consequence . . . . It is no longer possible to justify corruption and oppression
on the ground that they are part of the culture.” 14 It is suggested that corruption
is a result of imposing western economic and political models onto developing
societies: “it can be best described as a result of Western Structures being
applied to cultures with very different traditions of political and economic
organization.” 15 Others argue that corruption prevails wherever wide
discretionary powers are left in the hands of one individual, regardless of the
prevalent political or social model. 16 Whatever the cause of corruption may be,
the importance of putting a global anti-corruption convention in place is
obvious when one considers its devastating consequences.
It is argued that three particular consequences flow from corruption:
“diminished economic development and growth, increased social inequality,
and further distrust of government.” 17 Many developing countries rely on
foreign direct investment as a sure method of obtaining investment. Corruption
however deters such investment by acting as an added cost or tax for investors.
Government spending then becomes inefficient and public funds are often
diverted away from needed areas, leading to poor infrastructure, health
systems, and education systems: 18 “[c]orruption hurts the poor
disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a
government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice,
and discouraging foreign investment and aid.” 19
The issue of corruption received unprecedented attention in recent years
and is a testament to the urgency of the battle against corruption. 20 The priority
assigned to the adoption of effective instruments to combat corruption is
revealed by the following five international anti-corruption instruments created
within a short period of time: 21 The Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
14

Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT’L L.
717, 717 (2005).
15
Andrea D. Bontrager Unzicker, From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization Brings
a Multilateral Agreement Against Foreign Bribery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 655, 657
(2000).
16
See Dimitri Vlassis, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption Origins and
Negotiation Process, 66 RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES 126, 126 (2002).
17
Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J.
INT’L L. 413, 419 (2007).
18
See Vlassis, supra note 16, at 126.
19
U.N. Secretary-General, Statement On The Adoption By The General Assembly of The
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (Oct. 31 2003),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/ secretary-general-speech.html (last
visited July 19 2010).
20
See generally Rajesh R. Babu, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A
Critical Overview, ASIAN AFR. LEGAL CONSULTATIVE ORG. 2 (2006) (providing a critical
analysis on the UN Convention Against Corruption).
21
These instruments were adopted between 1996 and 2003.
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Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention), 22 the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(IACAC), 23 the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption (AUCPCC), 24 the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (CCLC), 25 and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC). 26 These agreements will be
analyzed alongside the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), 27 which rests at the center of our analysis.
This paper attempts to assess the relevancy and effectiveness of the
UNCAC. Part I offers an overview of the measures adopted by UNCAC as
well as the language used in its relevant provisions. The provisions which will
be examined include preventive measures, anti-bribery measures, and the more
innovative asset recovery provisions. Part II of this article illustrates two
different types of challenges faced by the UNCAC: compliance challenges and
existing multilateral anti-corruption treaties. While it is argued that compliance
is a measure of the UNCAC’s effectiveness, relevancy is measured by the need
for the adopted treaty. The UNCAC cannot be qualified as relevant if it has no
purpose. Giving an overview of other existing multilateral agreements meant to
tackle corruption will help evaluate the need for a global anti-corruption
convention. Given the lengthy task that is the fight against corruption, shortterm results should not be the only measure in assessing the effectiveness of
anti-corruption tools. If, however, the UNCAC is unable to sustain compliance
in the long-run, then it cannot be considered an efficacious tool.

22

See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
17, 1997, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
23
See Organization of American States [OAS], Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, March 29 1996, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter IACAC].
24
See African Union, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493fe36a2.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter
AU Corruption Convention].
25
See Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/173.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2011) [hereinafter CLCC].
26
See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter UNCTOC].
27
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc, A/58/4
(Nov. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf
[hereinafter UNCAC].
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Overview of the United Nations Convention against Corruption

“[The United Nations Convention against Corruption] is balanced, strong and
pragmatic, and it offers a new framework for effective action and international
cooperation.” 28
The battle against corruption has not only become more urgent, it has
also become more obvious as the extent of its reach is growingly apparent. 29
Not only does corruption impoverish economies, threaten democracy and
undermine the rule of law, it channels terrorism, organized crime and human
trafficking. 30 These far reaching consequences clearly indicate that the war
against corruption cannot be fought at the national level alone. 31 Corruption is
without a doubt a problem of international interest as it touches developed and
developing countries alike and respects no borders.
The UNCAC is a product of this heightened consciousness of
corruption as a growing and indiscriminate threat. In fact, the question of a
convention against corruption was initially debated during the negotiations for
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNCTOC), adopted in November of 2000. 32 It was agreed that even though
corruption was inherent to the matters included in the UNCTOC and should be
dealt with, 33 it was also far too complex a problem to be exhaustively covered
by the UNCTOC. Limited provisions on corruption were included with the
understanding that a separate treaty was to be envisaged in order to
appropriately tackle the vast issue of corruption. 34 To that end, the General
Assembly stated in 2001 that “an effective international legal instrument
against corruption, independent of the [UNCTOC]” 35 was necessary. Member
States agreed that preserving the “spirit achieved during the negotiation
28

UN Secretary-General, supra note 19.
In recent years, growing public interest has encouraged international organizations,
private organizations and governments to commission numerous studies illustrating the effects
and more concretely, the scale of the problem. See e.g., Corruption Perception Index 1995,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi (last visited
Nov. 29, 2011).
30
See generally U.N.O.D.C. Compendium of Int’l Legal Instruments on Corruption
(2005), http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/corruption-compendium-en.pdf.
31
See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and
Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International Law,
34 INT’L L. 149, 152 (2000).
32
The UNCTOC entered into force on September 29, 2003.
33
Furthermore, it was also decided that corruption constitutes a crime in which organized
criminal groups engage to fund their activities and therefore could not be overlooked in the
UNCTOC.
34
See Vlassis, supra note 16, at 127.
35
G.A. Res. 55/61, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/61 (Jan. 22, 2001), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010993.pdf; see also François
Vincke, L’anti-corruption après la Convention de Mérida, 85 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE
CRIMINOLOGIE [REV. DR. PÉN. & CR.] 351, 363 (2005) (Fr.).
29
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process for the UNCTOC” 36 and basing the negotiation process on shared
objectives and views as to the scope of the future convention were all crucial in
guaranteeing the success of the treaty. Following preparatory efforts,
negotiations started in the first quarter of 2002 and were conducted over the
course of seven negotiating sessions, between January 21, 2002 and October 1,
2003. The UNCAC was finally signed in Merida, in December of 2003. 37
Entering into force in December of 2005, 38 the UNCAC already had 140
signatures and 50 ratifications by April of the following year.
The UNCAC attempts to create global anticorruption standards and
obligations. With 148 Parties, the UNCAC’s claim to universality, some argue,
positions it as the leading international anti-corruption tool. 39 In fact, the list of
parties includes States that have not yet ratified any other international treaty
dealing with corruption. 40
An overview of the UNCAC and the negotiation process leading up to
its adoption are preliminary steps in order to assess its relevancy and
effectiveness. As is often the case, the negotiation rounds demonstrate those
areas of the UNCAC deemed to be controversial, the concessions made, and
the differing positions among Member States regarding the inclusion of certain
offences. These issues are important in determining its effectiveness and will
be highlighted throughout this overview of the UNCAC. Furthermore, a clear
understanding of the UNCAC’s many provisions on corruption is necessary in
order to fully assess its contribution to the existing legal anti-corruption
framework.
The purpose of the UNCAC is threefold:
(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat
corruption more efficiently and effectively;
(b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation
and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against
corruption, including in asset recovery;
(c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management
of public affairs and public property. 41

36

Vlassis, supra note 16, at 128.
See Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global
Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 205 (2005).
38
In accordance with Article 68(1) of Resolution 58/4, UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 68(1),
the UNCAC entered into force ninety days after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of
ratification.
39
See generally Lucinda A. Low, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: The
Globalization of Anticorruption Standards, THE AWAKENING GIANT OF ANTICORRUPTION
ENFORCEMENT, conference presentation give on May 4, 2006, at pt. I, available at
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2599.pdf.
40
For example, the People’s Republic of China ratified the UNCAC on Jan. 13, 2006.
41
UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 1.
37
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Four main areas can be identified in the UNCAC, each divided into
separate chapters: preventive measures, criminalization, international
cooperation, and asset recovery. 42 These issues are the UNCAC’s founding
pillars. 43
This section will give a brief overview of the UNCAC’s content, and try
to give a preliminary assessment as to whether or not it has any “teeth” 44 by
attempting to interpret the language used. As will be demonstrated, the
obligations imposed upon the Member States by the UNCAC are drafted using
terms that vary from highly discretionary to mandatory.
A.

Preventive Measures

The “multifaceted” nature of corruption and the need to eliminate it in a
sustainable manner (as opposed to a short-term fix) requires the pursuit of
extensive preventive measures. 45 Where such measures are lacking, reliance is
habitually placed on defined offences and sanctions in cases of violation.
However, this type of approach does not serve as a strong deterrent in
practice, 46 but rather as a band-aid to a bleeding wound. Prevention is therefore
necessary in order to deny criminal activity its breeding ground and to cut off
corruption before it can take root. The UNCAC’s provisions on preventive
measures are applicable to both the public and private sectors. 47 In this respect,
the UNCAC goes much further than previous anti-corruption treaties, such as
the AU Corruption Convention and the IACAC. 48
Among the UNCAC’s preventive public sector measures is the
requirement that Member States ensure the existence of independent anticorruption bodies capable of implementing, coordinating, and overseeing anticorruption policies:
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental
principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or
bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as:
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this
42

See id., chs. II–V.
See United Nations Convention against Corruption, UNODC UPDATE (Dec. 1, 2003), at
3, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/newsletter_2003-12-01_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2011).
44
The expression refers to a form of coercive enforcement. See Press Release, U.N. News
Centre, General Assembly Approves International Treaty Against Corruption, (Oct. 31, 2003);
see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 29 (1995).
45
See Benjamin W. Heineman & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85
FOREIGN AFFS. 75, 77 (2006).
46
See Indira Carr, The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a Real
Difference to the Quality of Life of Millions?, 3 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 40 (2006).
47
See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International
Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 691, 718 (2007).
48
See UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 5–14; see also Low, supra note 39, at pt. II.
43
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Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating
the implementation of those policies;
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention
of corruption. 49
The importance of such bodies or agencies cannot be stressed enough:
they are the intermediary between governments and public opinion, making
their political independence that much more important. If they are neither
transparent nor held accountable to the public, their impact becomes trivial.
The result is similar in situations where anti-corruption agency employees dare
not criticize government conduct for fear of being removed or demoted. 50 In
light of these concerns, the UNCAC requires that state parties confer upon
these agencies the necessary independence in order to ensure the absence of
any undue influence. 51
At first glance the article seems to be phrased in legally binding terms.
However, the use of the stringent term “shall” is offset by the phrase “in
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system.” In light of this
clause, opinions regarding the mandatory versus permissive quality of the
language are divided. 52 It is clear that the provision contains a “qualifying
clause,” 53 allowing for a potential escape route for Member States. What at
first glance may seem as a result-oriented obligation may prove to be
deceiving; the result in each case will be different and subject to each Member
State’s existing legal structure, which may cause uneven implementation
among parties.
The most controversial preventive public sector measure created by the
UNCAC is related to the oversight of campaign finance. 54 It calls upon
Member States to enhance transparency in the funding of political parties and
of candidates for elected office. 55 However novel in its nature, the obligation
has a discretionary quality, allowing members to “consider” taking measures
with respect to political funding. 56
Other preventive public sector requirements include provisions
concerning the establishment of transparent public procurement systems,
public financing accountability measures, 57 merit-based systems for the
49

UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 6.
See Jeremy Pope & Frank Vogl, Making Anticorruption Agencies More Effective, 37
FIN. & DEV. 6, 6 (2000).
51
UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 6(2).
52
Indeed, some authors consider that the provision is written in mandatory terms. See
Snider & Kidane, supra note 47, at 707. Whereas others maintain it is permissive in nature. See
Webb, supra note 37, at 206; Low, supra note 39, at pt. II.
53
Webb, supra note 37, at 206 (“These qualifying clauses provide a potential escape
clause for reluctant legislators.”).
54
See Low, supra note 39, at pt. II.
55
See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 7(3).
56
See id. art. 7(2)–(3).
57
See id. art. 9.
50
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selection of civil servants, 58 and the application of codes of conduct for public
officials. 59 The clause “in accordance with the fundamental principles of its
legal system” is present in all of these articles, once again affording Member
States a certain level of discretion.
Provisions relating to the judiciary, as well as the prosecution, strive to
prevent “opportunities for corruption,” by using very broad language:
Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial
role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system
and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures
to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for
corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures
may include rules with respect to the conduct of members of the
judiciary. 60
Private sector corruption was most definitely a hot topic of discussion
during the negotiations among Member States, as previous international
treaties had remained silent on this matter. 61 Regional instruments had
however already gone in this direction, for example in Europe and Africa. 62
Given the fact that the line between the public and private sectors is becoming
increasingly blurred as a result of outsourcing and privatization, the rapid
growth of the private sector in some countries, 63 and the growing influence of
multinational corporations, it would have been negligent to refuse to
criminalize corruption in both sectors. 64 The adoption of anti-corruption
measures in the private sector in the UNCAC, similar to those applicable to the
public sector, recognizes the gradual convergence of both sectors. 65
The preventive measures that are focused on the private sector pertain to
auditing and accounting standards as well as to the enforcement of penalties
(whether civil, administrative, or criminal). Although the terminology used in
these provisions is broad, at least an important number of measures are
proposed. However, countries are once again called upon to uphold such
measures without prejudice to the fundamental principles of their national
law. 66 More forceful language is used regarding tax deductions. In effect,
58

See id. art. 7.
See id. art. 8.
60
Id. art. 11. (emphasis added).
61
See Webb, supra note 37, at 213.
62
See Joint Action 98/742, arts. 2–3, 1998 O.J. (L 358) 2 (EU) [hereinafter Joint Action]
(addressing corruption in the private sector); AU Corruption Convention, supra note 24, art. 4.
63
This is the case for example in China. See Annual Report, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
(2006), www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Annual_Report/2006/ADB-AR2006-EastAsia.PDF.
64
See Irwin Arieff, UN Anti-Corruption Pact Raises Last-Minute Alarms, REUTERS, June
29, 2003 (comments made by Jeremy Pope of Transparency International).
65
See Webb, supra note 37, at 215.
66
UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 12(1).
59
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article 12(4) of the UNCAC requires that Member States prohibit the tax
deductibility of expenses that constitute bribes. 67 Having created a number of
measures aimed at preventing corruption, the UNCAC then tackles the heart of
the issue with a detailed list of specific offences, some of which will be
illustrated in the following chapter.
B.

Criminalization and Law Enforcement

The UNCAC’s chapter entitled “Criminalization and Law Enforcement”
constitutes the core of the UNCAC and defines various offences as well as
provisions detailing their application and enforcement. 68 This section will
attempt to give an overview of some of the articles under the UNCAC as well
as the measures set out to enforce them.
1.

Criminalization

There is a wide array of opinions on what constitutes public corruption,
and some are more inclusive or broad than others. There is indeed a lack of
uniformity among international instruments regarding the scope of the crime,
and the often broad or unspecific language allows for differing interpretations.
This complicates harmonization efforts, as Member States will have differing
interpretations of the offence, causing them to apply different legal standards
and solutions. It has, however, been widely maintained that public corruption
refers almost exclusively to bribery and it is viewed as the “most identified
form of corruption.” 69 In fact, past international anti-corruption tools have
relied on bribery as the standard offence of public corruption. 70 It can be
contended that bribery has over time become almost synonymous with
corruption. This unfortunate outcome restricts the scope and reach of anticorruption tools, ignoring other activities enabling personal enrichment
through the misuse of authority, which therefore fall under the breadth of
corruption. 71
The UNCAC innovates by criminalizing corruption in its wider
meaning 72 including bribery but also other bribery-related offences. These
include embezzlement, 73 trading in influence, 74 abuse of functions, 75 illicit
67

See id. at art. 12(4).
See id. at arts. 15–42.
69
See Ruth Nicholls, Corruption in the South Pacific: The Potential Impact of the UN
Convention Against Corruption on Pacific Island States, 2 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 207, 225 (2005).
70
Such as the IACAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the CLCC.
71
See Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International
Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793, 796
(2001).
72
See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against Official
Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 723 (2006).
73
See UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 17, 22.
74
See id. art. 18.
75
See id. art. 19.
68
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enrichment, 76 money laundering, 77 and obstruction of justice. 78
According to experts, there are three principal justifications for
criminalizing bribery at the domestic and international levels. 79 The first
justification offered is the need to uphold the integrity of public administration
as it influences the public’s view of society. Indeed, society’s trust in
governance mechanisms is essential in fostering the democratic society model.
This “need” creates a beneficial cycle in that the public nature of the officials’
job plays a role in preventing bribe taking. For instance, the risk of removal
from office may in some cases prevent the acceptance of a bribe. A second
justification in defense of criminalizing bribery is the need to protect the
proper functioning of public administration. Although this principle sounds
similar to the first, it refers to efficiency rather than integrity (whereas
efficiency refers to the internal functioning of public administration, integrity
refers to the appearance of proper functioning). 80 Finally, safeguarding fair
competition and transparency are paramount in ensuring that government funds
are not allocated to undeserving bidders. 81
The most commonly accepted definition of bribery is “the abuse of
public office for private gain.” 82 The term ‘abuse’ refers to the supply and
demand sides of bribery. 83 The supply side concerns the offering of a bribe,
whereas the demand side refers to its acceptance or request. 84 Within the
UNCAC, both the bribery of national and foreign public officials is
criminalized, 85 and both offences are defined using mandatory terms. 86
The specific actions that are criminalized are the offering, giving,
promising, acceptance, and solicitation of any “undue advantage.” 87
Unfortunately the UNCAC does not define the notion of “undue advantage.” It
is however agreed that it covers any type of advantage, whether material or
immaterial, monetary or non-pecuniary. 88 Previous national and multilateral
instruments criminalizing bribery distinguished pecuniary benefits from favors
76

See id. art. 20.
See id. art. 23.
78
See id. art. 25.
79
See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of
the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 233, 241 (1999); Guy Stessens, The
International Fight Against Corruption, 72 REVUE INT’L DE DROIT PENAL 892, 894 (2001)
(Belg.); see also Henning, supra note 71, at 794 n.5.
80
See Stephen R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and
Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 657, 676 (2000).
81
See Stessens, supra note 79, at 895.
82
See Williams & Beare, supra note 3, at 117.
83
Also commonly referred to as active and passive bribery. See Stessens, supra note 79, at
901.
84
See Salbu, supra note 80, at 671; see also U.N.C.A.C., supra note 27, art. 15(a), (b).
85
See UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 15–16.
86
See Low, supra note 39, pt. III(a).
87
UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 15–16, 21.
88
See Stessens, supra note 79, at 904; Martin Polaine, Criminalizing Bribery of National
and Foreign Officials, 8 ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/1/35167663.pdf.
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and other types of advantages. 89 It can therefore be argued that the UNCAC
encompasses a wider array of advantages, as it “clearly refers to something to
which the recipient concerned was not entitled.” 90 The bribe must be carried
out in the individual’s official capacity, “in the exercise of his or her official
duties.” 91 The illicit advantage need not be destined to the official, but any
third party, whether a person or an entity, such as a family member or an
organization of which the official is a member.
The provision criminalizing the bribery of national public officials uses
strong, binding terms: the Parties to the UNCAC must adopt legislative
measures targeting supply and demand bribery. 92 An important concern with
regard to the article’s application is the definition of “public official” as
defined in article 2(a) of the UNCAC. 93 It is a semi-autonomous definition in
that it defines the notion regardless of domestic law, but in addition it allows
for the consideration of local definitions. 94
The definition applies to all government branches, namely the
legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial branches. The officials need
not be permanently employed or remunerated in order to fall under the scope
of the definition. 95 Unfortunately, the UNCAC does not define the term
“public enterprise,” meaning that its interpretation will be left to the discretion
of each Member State.
The bribery of foreign public officials, as well as those of public
international organizations, is covered in article 16 of the UNCAC. 96 The
supply and demand sides of bribery have both been criminalized in respect to
foreign public officials, but the two offences are not treated equally. The
supply side requires criminalization using the terms “shall adopt,” whereas the
demand side need only be “considered” as an offence. 97 The choice of terms
reflects the influence of jurisdictional issues: the demand side, holding foreign
countries accountable, is criminalized using more discretionary terminology.
Many international instruments have focused merely on the supply
aspect of bribery. 98 Reasons for the sparse criminalization of passive bribery in
the past have had more to do with legal issues such as enforcement,
89

See Snider & Kidane, supra note 47, at 720; see e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1977); IACAC, supra note 23, at 724, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html; AU Corruption Convention, supra
note 24, art. 4.
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Polaine, supra note 88, at 8.
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UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 15–16.
92
See id. art. 15.
93
See Low, supra note 39, pt. III(A).
94
See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 2(a)(iii).
95
See id. art. 2 (a)(i).
96
See id. art. 16.
97
See id. ¶¶ 1–2.
98
See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of
New International Legal Consensus, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 457, 480 (1997). There are,
however, multilateral instruments that criminalize both the supply and demand sides of
bribery, such as the A.U. Corruption Convention and the IACAC.
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implementation, and jurisdiction, rather than political or social considerations.
It is more feasible to control the offering of a bribe through extra-territorial
legislation than it is to control the actions of a foreign official:
Transnational laws that attack the demand side of bribery are
feasible, but jurisdictional impediments create additional hurdles
that are not applicable to supply-side legislation regulating
domestic firms. Outlawing foreign officials’ acceptance of
bribes would require multilateral treaties that confer the
necessary jurisdictional authority. However, these efforts would
prove frustrating. Those nations that would participate in that
kind of treaty arrangement would probably be committed to
fighting corruption, making extraterritorial intervention
unnecessary. In contrast, those nations that refuse to participate
may lack a commitment to fight transnational corruption. 99
The “jurisdictional impediment” refers to the lack of enthusiasm on the
part of States towards initiatives aimed at criminalizing the actions of another
country’s public officials, as this would clearly impede sovereignty. 100
Before the adoption of the UNCAC, it had been argued that legislators
should consider drafting passive bribery provisions to complement the already
existing provisions against supply-side bribery. 101 The following explanation
may help to explain why the UNCAC’s provisions are not more stringent in
regards to the solicitation of bribes: “corruption is like adultery: ninety percent
of it is a matter of opportunity. If you eliminate the opportunities, you
eliminate the crime.” 102 Although this may be logical in theory, a persistent
demand for bribery will encourage its illicit counterpart. Indeed, many acts of
bribery are initiated by public officials. 103 The reason for this is simple. The
officials are the ones with the upper hand, with the position of power. It is
therefore more likely that they would be the ones to broach the subject of
bribes. 104
Similar to previous conventions, 105 the UNCAC’s definition of what
99

See Salbu, supra note 80, at 685 n.211.
See Webb, supra note 37, at 228; see, e.g., Constitutive Act of the African Union, art.
4, July 11, 2000, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm; Charter of the
Organization of American States, art. 21, Dec. 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N.C.A.C., supra
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Gantz, supra note 98, at 480.
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See Salbu, supra note 80, at 686. The author suggests this as a speculative argument.
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632.
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constitutes a foreign public official is completely autonomous, as it does not
call for Member States to consider domestic law. In comparing the definitions
of “public official” and “foreign public official,” it is clear that the latter is
broader because it contains no reference to national law. For instance, a foreign
public official could be prosecuted in a situation where, if it were a matter of
internal or national conduct, the act would not be punishable. 106 Such an
outcome could have serious far-reaching implications for state sovereignty.
However, in addition to the fact that the bribery of foreign public officials is
phrased in a non-mandatory manner, it is unlikely to apply to the demand
aspect of bribery because the definition disregards domestic law. 107 Simply
put, it is difficult to conceive that a foreign public official should be punished
for passive corruption when the reproached conduct is not prohibited in the
official’s own country. 108
The meaning of “foreign public official” is stated as “any person
holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign
country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a public
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public
enterprise.” 109
An “official of a public international organization” is held to be “an
international civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an
organization to act on behalf of that organization.” 110 This development
reflects the fact that public international organizations have a significant
economic impact in developing countries through development projects and
humanitarian aid. 111 Other tools such as the AU Corruption Convention and
the IACAC failed to include this category of individuals. 112
The debate on private sector corruption during the UNCAC’s
negotiation process highlighted strong opposing opinions. 113 More and more
public oriented activities are being transferred to the private sector through
outsourcing and privatization, blurring the line between sectors. This
convergence not only calls for anti-corruption measures, but may potentially
create fraud or bribery opportunities in the very act of transferring substantial
budgets and regulatory powers from one sector to another. 114 Furthermore,
multinational corporations have a significant economic influence that must be
included in any international anti-corruption strategy if it is to be effective. 115
providing for a lower burden of proof on the prosecuting party. See Stessens, supra note 79, at
911.
106
See id. at 911.
107
See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 16(2).
108
See Stessens, supra note 79, at 912.
109
UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 2(b).
110
Id. art. 2(c).
111
See Snider & Kidane, supra note 47, at 733.
112
See id.
113
See Webb, supra note 37, at 212–13.
114
Id. at 212–13; Babu, supra note 20, at 15; Vlassis, supra note 16, at 126; Stessens,
supra note 79, at 914.
115
See Webb, supra note 37, at 213.
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During the UNCAC’s negotiation, the EU held strong in its drive to
include a private-to-private provision, backed by the Group of Latin American
and Caribbean States that stated: “adopting a ‘limited’ approach ‘would
adversely affect the implementation of the future convention.’” 116 These States
were of the opinion that targeting only the public sector would have a
detrimental effect on the UNCAC’s success and ability to tackle public
corruption. 117 On the other hand, the United States’ opposition to the inclusion
of a purely private sector provision was forceful, despite their own existing
national legislation regarding bribery in the private sector as applying to
private-to-public situations. 118 The fear was that “extending the treaty to the
private sector could create a private right of action opening the door to lawsuits
in foreign courts.” 119 A compromise was reached where private-to-private
corruption was ultimately criminalized, yet not phrased in mandatory terms. 120
In the past, the phenomenon of private corruption has been commonly
dealt with through civil law proceedings, not criminal law. 121 Within the
UNCAC, private sector bribery is criminalized under article 21. The
obligation, however, is framed in non-binding language. 122
Both the supply and demand sides are criminalized, although using
non-mandatory wording. 123 Nevertheless, it is believed that many countries
might still adopt such measures by following the examples of the Council of
Europe and the EU. 124 Furthermore, many States that have undergone
significant privatization have come to realize that bribery in the private sector
should be criminalized on the same level as public sector bribery. 125
The UNCAC also criminalizes bribery-related offences in the public
and private sectors, such as trading in influence, abuse of functions or position,
illicit enrichment, embezzlement, and laundering of crime proceeds. 126
116

See id. (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention
Against Corruption, Third Session, Vienna, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a
Convention Against Corruption, A/AC.261/9 (2002), at 3).
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See Antonio Argandona, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its
Impact on International Companies 9 (Univ. of Navarra IESE Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
656, 2006) (“Tolerance of private corruption inevitably makes it more difficult to prevent and
combat public corruption.”).
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 nationally criminalizes private-to-public
bribes paid abroad. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.
(1977). See also Webb, supra note 37, at 213.
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Arieff, supra note 64, at 2.
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See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 21 (stating that each Member State “shall consider
adopting” measures outlawing bribery in the private sector).
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See Stessens, supra note 79, at 914.
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See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 21.
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See id. art. 21(a)–(b).
124
See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (EC), art. 7, (Treaty No.27 2006) 7,
(stating that the criminalization of commercial bribery and the CECC require the
criminalization of commercial bribery). The EU has decided that the states should do the same.
See Joint Action, supra note 63.
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See Low, supra note 39, at 10.
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See UNCAC, supra note 27, at arts. 18–20, 22, 23. These specific offences are not
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Interpretive and Law Enforcement Measures

Along with the list of specific offences detailed above, Chapter III of
the UNCAC also includes interpretive and law enforcement measures. These
provisions add important practical measures that should help in promoting
harmonization among national anti-corruption laws. 127
a.

General Law Enforcement Considerations

This section groups together certain provisions of a more general
nature. They refer to basic concepts of criminal law, such as sanctions, intent,
and liability.
i.

Intent

In the realm of transnational criminal activity, a major problem in
prosecuting offences is the difficulty of obtaining evidence, coupled with the
heavy burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution. 128 The presumption of
innocence requires that the prosecuting counsel prove that the accused
intended his or her actions and their consequences. 129 Within the UNCAC,
intent is a required element in the offence of bribery as it is for all of the other
offences created. 130
The interpretation of the fault element or mens rea of the crime will
vary in different legal systems. 131 For instance, in the common law tradition,
corruption requires specific intent. In other words, the intent to commit the act
is required (in this case the offering or accepting of a bribe) as well as for the
action’s consequences (in this case the intent to act upon the given or accepted
bribe). 132 In other jurisdictions, specific intent is not required, 133 lightening the
burden of proof for the prosecution. In this respect, the UNCAC is the first
anti-corruption convention that clearly stipulates how intent is to be construed,
diminishing the debate on whether a subjective or objective test is to be
discussed in detail in this study.
127
See Low, supra note 39, at 12.
128
See Abdullahi Y. Shehu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: Bliss or Bluster?, 12 J.
FIN. CRIME 69, 82 (2005). Requirements relating to burden of proof also hinder the possibility
of speedy trials. Furthermore, it is contended that anti-corruption efforts in most countries have
been affected by evidentiary difficulties: “Among the challenges of proof are issues of how
funds were stolen from the public treasury in one country and stashed in another jurisdiction
with completely different legal systems.”
129
See Heba Shams, The Fight Against Extraterritorial Corruption and the Use of Money
Laundering Control, 7 LAW & BUS. R. AM. 85, 113 (2001).
130
See UNCAC, supra note 27, arts.15–27.
131
See Ruth Nicholls, supra note 69, at 227.
132
See POLAINE, supra note 88, at 17. This is the case in Canada in relation to the bribery
of officials. See Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C., 1985, c. C-486, art. 20 (Can.).
133
See id. at 18. This is the case in Slovenia in relation to the crime of bribery.
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applied. 134 To soften the burden of proof resting on the prosecution, the
UNCAC allows for reliance on inferential evidence: “[K]nowledge, intent or
purpose required as an element of an offence established in accordance with
this Convention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.” 135
Given that the burden is slightly lightened, this provision should considerably
help the prosecution of offences under the UNCAC. 136
ii.

Sanctions

Although the UNCAC lists many offences, the sanctions which attach
to each offence are far from exhaustive. 137 The UNCAC stipulates in article
30, “each Party shall make the commission of an offence established in
accordance with this Convention liable to sanctions that take into account the
gravity of that offence.” 138 However, it is unclear how the concept of gravity
should be construed. 139 Does it refer to the gravity of the act itself or to its
consequences? The answer will vary with the interpretation given by each
Member State. In fact, considering that sentencing policies vary greatly among
countries, it is understandable that this area of the law has thus far not been
harmonized. 140
One of the principle provisions dealing with sanctions has proven to be
quite controversial and touches the issue of immunities. 141 Article 30 of the
UNCAC stipulates:
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and
constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any
immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public
officials for the performance of their functions and the
possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating,
prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance
with this Convention. 142
From this particular wording, it appears that the UNCAC grants
Member States a very wide discretion regarding immunities and privileges,
which considering their role in hindering the prosecution of officials in the
past, may prove to be a significant barrier to the removal and punishment of

134
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corrupt officials. 143
iii.

Jurisdiction

The UNCAC’s provision on jurisdiction is of broad significance as it
applies to all criminalization articles under the UNCAC, and is consistent with
similar provisions adopted by previous anti-corruption agreements, such as the
OECD Convention. 144 In regards to both conventions, parties are asked to
merely consult with one another when determining the appropriate jurisdiction
for prosecution. 145 Article 42 of the UNCAC confers jurisdiction whether the
offence is committed on the state’s territory, by or against a national of the
state party, or against the state itself. 146 However, since many of the offences
under the UNCAC are capable of being committed in more than one
jurisdiction, 147 the provision may not have been adequately drafted and should
have anticipated this scenario. In money laundering cases in particular,
assessing the location of the crime is complex and can lead to the investigation
and prosecution of a crime in two countries.
In assessing the efficacy of the UNCAC, the actual wording of the
provisions that criminalize specific acts of corruption is of the utmost interest.
Other aspects need to be considered, however, for they will undoubtedly
impact the UNCAC’s ability to eradicate corrupt practices.
b.

Investigation and Procedural Aspects

Anti-corruption tools typically suffer from enforcement difficulties in
part because of investigation shortcomings and because of the concealed nature
of the crimes. 148 The successful prosecution of cases depends highly on leads
provided by informants (sometimes referred to as whistleblowers) who—
because of the sensitive nature of the information they possess—are often
threatened and intimidated. 149 Unfortunately, the UNCAC must face these
difficulties, and to that end it has anticipated the need for measures to protect
witnesses, experts, victims, and reporting individuals, thus aiding them in
coming forward with information. 150 States are called upon to either “consider
incorporating” 151 into their domestic legislation appropriate measures to
protect reporting persons or to establish measures “in accordance with [their]
domestic legal system and within [their] means.” 152 The reason for the
143
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discretionary language is perhaps explained by the costs and resources needed
to implement such measures. 153 This is particularly so in countries facing high
levels of corruption, therefore needing to provide for the protection of more
individuals. 154 In addition, these countries are most often some of the poorer
developing countries. 155
Another measure that may prove to be costly for Member States
concerns the obligation to establish enforcement bodies. In order to ensure that
Member States can effectively prosecute and investigate offences under the
UNCAC, Member States must establish independent and specialized anticorruption enforcement bodies, subject to the fundamental principles of their
legal systems. Emphasis is put on the importance of independence and the need
for cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 156 The degree of autonomy
conferred upon such authorities is however left to the discretion of each state,
to be determined through relevant national legislation. 157 It is the author’s
opinion that this provision was placed in the UNCAC’s chapter on
criminalization and law enforcement despite the fact that it can also be
qualified as a preventive provision. 158
Parties to the UNCAC must take measures in order to strengthen
cooperation between public or government officials and prosecuting
authorities, in accordance with Member States’ domestic laws. 159 Such
measures include but are not limited to providing enforcement authorities with
requested information and to inform them when they have reasonable grounds
to believe that an offence has been committed. 160 The same types of measures
are called for between national authorities and the private sector, with
particular emphasis on financial institutions. 161 These provisions encourage the
transmission of relevant information in regard to the commission of offences
under the UNCAC.
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See Carr, supra note 46, at 27.
This assumption is based on the premise that a higher number of corruption cases
causes a higher number of informants. This is undoubtedly a simple reasoning because it does
not factor in environmental considerations such as social pressure, culture, and poverty.
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Iraq, Haiti, Uzbekistan, Tonga, Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, and Laos. See Corruption
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Consequences of Corruption and Private Rights
of Action

The UNCAC’s measures on civil liability and damages are far
reaching, 162 and will undoubtedly enhance deterrence by creating additional
weapons: civil and administrative sanctions. A possible outcome of the
implementation of these provisions is a gradual privatization of law
enforcement: “[t]hese two articles thus signal a resolve on the part of
negotiators of the UN Convention to unleash the power of private civil
litigation and collateral legal and administrative sanctions on persons that
commit corrupt practices.” 163 Moreover, recalling the difficulties associated
with the investigation and prosecution of offences, the evidence obtained from
civil trials could be used in ongoing investigations or in future criminal
trials. 164
Article 35 explicitly establishes a private right of action, using
discretionary terms:
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary,
in accordance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that
entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an
act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain
compensation. 165
The language used in the provision seems to give considerable latitude
to countries in determining the parameters of a private right of action.
The UNCAC also contains a separate provision allowing Member States
to “consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or
rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or other similar instrument . . .” 166
Article 34 allows Member States to take measures allowing them to address
the consequences of corruption. Although implementation is subject to the
fundamental principles of the State’s domestic law, its inclusion is significant
since this type of provision was not previously part of anti-corruption
treaties. 167 Furthermore, the provision is not limited to convicted offenders
under the UNCAC, which allows it to apply to a wider array of situations. 168
Close attention should therefore be paid as to how Member States will
implement this measure: “Companies that do business abroad or at home
through government contracts, concessions, licenses and permits should be
aware that this provision may prompt more widespread revocation of rights
162
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than has historically been the case.” 169
C.

Asset Recovery

The UNCAC is seen as revolutionizing the realm of asset recovery in the
field of international law. 170 The importance of the UNCAC’s provisions
pertaining to asset recovery, however, can only be properly understood when
considered against past international initiatives aimed at curtailing corruption
and the looting of funds. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the
equivalent of approximately two percent of the world’s gross domestic product
(up to US $1.8 trillion) is laundered on a yearly basis and that a “significant
portion of that activity involves funds derived from corruption.” 171
An interesting example of the severity of the problem is the case of
Nigeria, which has been flagged for its high profile corruption cases. 172 Of the
estimated $400 billion that has been looted from the African continent, about a
quarter is said to originate from Nigeria, a country in which an important
majority of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. 173 Another example
is that of Indonesia, where Mohamed Suharto (President for almost thirty years
and recently deceased) allegedly stole up to $35 billion from his own
people. 174
Considering the staggering amount of funds lost, it is surprising that only
169
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recently, clauses on the recovery of stolen assets have been included in a
multilateral treaty dealing with corruption. Indeed, while previously adopted
regional and multilateral anti-corruption tools provide for the seizing and
freezing of assets, they do not extensively cover the issue of asset recovery. 175
The UNCAC therefore enters new territory in this respect, being the first anticorruption treaty to tackle the issue. 176 Veering away from a penalty approach
to criminal law, the UNCAC targets a more profit-oriented perspective in its
attempt to create mechanisms to recover stolen assets. 177
The draft resolution for the negotiation of the UNCAC originally
proposed that a separate instrument be negotiated on the subject of the
repatriation of stolen funds. As a result of negotiations, however, it was
decided that both draft resolutions would be combined into one, placing asset
recovery at the very center of the UNCAC. 178 During the first negotiation
session, representatives from the Group of 77, 179 the European Union and
other Latin American and African States insisted that the UNCAC should
address the issue of asset recovery. They stressed the need to develop measures
and mechanisms for the recovery of stolen funds and property. Furthermore,
several representatives insisted on the highly complex nature of these issues,
referring to the tracing of funds and the identification of their rightful
owners. 180
To that effect, an informative seminar on the return of illicit funds was
proposed by Peru and supported by Spain to cover practical and legal issues
surrounding the implications of cases involving stolen funds and their
return. 181 At the second negotiation session held in Vienna in June of 2002, the
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of the UNCAC stated
the following: “[T]he question of asset recovery is one of the fundamental
aspects of the [UNCAC] and would also serve as an indicator of the political
will to join forces in order to protect the common good.” 182 It was the general
175

See Carr, supra note 46, at 29 (referencing the AU and OAS conventions on
corruption.)
176
See Low, supra note 39, at 19.
177
See Jorge, supra note 172, at 4.
178
Vlassis, supra note 16, at 128.
179
The Group of 77 was established on June 15, 1964 by developing countries signatories
to the Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries. Among its goals is to provide “the
means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic
interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic
issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for
development.” See THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last
visited Feb. 16 2011).
180
See REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION
AGAINST CORRUPTION, U.N.O.D.C., 2d Sess., A/AC.261/4 (2002) at 9 [hereinafter ANTICORRUPTION REPORT, 2d Sess.].
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opinion that these matters would be quite difficult to negotiate, given the
complexities involved in investigating and recovering stolen assets, as well as
problems related to the gathering of evidence, international cooperation, issues
of cost, and jurisdiction. 183
The asset recovery chapter received important support from both
developing and developed countries:
This is a particularly important issue for many developing
countries where high-level corruption has plundered the national
wealth, and where resources are badly needed for reconstruction
and the rehabilitation of societies under new governments.
Reaching agreement on this chapter has involved intensive
negotiations, as the needs of countries seeking the illicit assets
had to be reconciled with the legal and procedural safeguards of
the countries whose assistance is sought. 184
Many countries submitted proposals with specific sections addressing
the proceeds of corruption. The United States found the subject so pressing that
one of its draft proposals concerned only the redrafting of the asset recovery
provisions, 185 whereas Austria and the Netherlands submitted revised texts on
virtually every provision of the UNCAC. 186 Canada, however, qualified the
discussion on asset recovery as unsatisfactory, arguing that the concept itself
was too broad and its consequences far-reaching, and that it covered a
multitude of legal situations, some more complex than others. 187 Indeed,
recovering stolen assets in an international setting can be a highly complex
task, necessitating the availability of funds, technical cooperation, and experts
from many countries (to name a few, experts in accounting, criminal law, civil

CORRUPTION REPORT, 1st Sess.]; see also REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, U.N.O.D.C., 3d Sess,
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corruption, and are in need of recovering funds stolen from them.
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590 (2002).
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law, and money laundering). 188
Although developed and developing countries had diverging opinions
about the content and scope of the asset recovery provisions, the need for some
type of measure to be included was not a matter of debate. Although solidarity
can sometimes give way to differing interests, 189 the contrary is also true:
When a problem or issue affects many, efforts tend to coalesce.
In its final version, not only is asset recovery explicitly stated as a
“fundamental principle” of the UNCAC, but Member States are required to
“afford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this
regard.” 190 A whole chapter is dedicated to the recovery of stolen assets as well
as other measures dealing with money laundering and prevention. 191 As set out
in the UNCAC, the recovery of assets must be preceded by three stages:
investigation, prevention, and confiscation. 192 The prevention provisions are
unique to the UNCAC and are written using mandatory language. 193
Prevention refers to the freezing and seizing of assets to prevent their transfer
into unlawful hands. 194 For instance, article 52, focusing primarily on the
prevention and detection of the transfer of proceeds of crime, requires Member
States to take measures to ensure that financial institutions verify their
customers’ identity and maintain client records in a multitude of situations.
The provision’s overall goal is to detect suspicious transactions and address
large-scale corruption carried out by high-ranking officials. 195 Furthermore,
disclosure systems for public officials, although discretionary in nature, are
provided for to enable information sharing among states during
investigations. 196
As for recovery of assets, the UNCAC covers direct and indirect
recovery. 197 The direct recovery provision requires that States take measures to
afford Member States a civil right of action to “establish title to or ownership
of property,” 198 acquired through corrupt behavior and later recovered, in
accordance with their domestic law. 199 This provision not only helps
188
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harmonize civil and criminal proceedings, it also offers plaintiffs an important
advantage: that of a lower burden of proof (preponderance of probability as
opposed to beyond all reasonable doubt). 200 Indirect measures include the
recognition of confiscation orders prepared by other States, 201 and measures
allowing for the freezing and seizure of property pending investigation. 202
Articles 55 through 57 pertain to confiscation through international
cooperation, seizure and the return and disposal of assets. While these
provisions can be considered as an expansion of earlier international anticorruption tools, article 57 merits special attention. 203 The disposal of proceeds
obtained through corruption was widely discussed, mainly regarding whether
the requesting State or the confiscating State should be lawfully compensated
on the basis of either a surviving property right or on compensation for
malfeasance. The provision provides an answer to this dilemma by setting out:
“a series of provisions governing return of confiscated proceeds and other
property which generally prefers return to the requesting State Party, but sets
stronger rules in cases where the property interest of that state party is the
strongest.” 204 Article 31 of the UNCAC, which is included in the
“Criminalization and Law Enforcement” chapter, also deals with the
confiscation of the proceeds of crime, as well as their freezing and seizure.
While these provisions were always necessary to guarantee the
effectiveness of the UNCAC, their inclusion and acceptance by Member States
represent a significant breakthrough and was never a foregone conclusion.
Because of the UNCAC’s universal quality, it may prove to have an important
advantage over regional anti-corruption tools in respect to asset recovery,
especially when considering that States are not necessarily members of the
same regional initiatives. 205 Although previous regional agreements, such as
the AU Corruption Convention, the IACAC, and the Council of Europe’s
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, do address the question of asset
recovery, none offer the legal framework contained in the UNCAC. 206
One may observe the different levels of norms contained in the
UNCAC. The mixture of strict and discretionary language is not unusual
within international agreements and is not a weakness per se. 207 The following
chapter attempts to assess what issues may affect the UNCAC’s effectiveness
from a legal standpoint. In the last chapter we will offer an overview of the
200
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existing multilateral anti-corruption framework in order to assess the need for
further anti-corruption legislation, and therefore the UNCAC’s relevancy.
III.

Barriers to the Effectiveness and Relevancy of the UNCAC

The title of this chapter refers to effectiveness and relevancy. In this
article, it is suggested that effectiveness is measured by results, both on the
long and short terms. A high level of compliance will yield positive results,
and to ensure compliance, a legal tool must be enforceable: “an agreement is
likely to be more effective the greater the degree to which its parties comply
with its obligations.” 208
Compliance may be defined as “the degree to which a State behaves in
a manner that conforms to its legal obligations.” 209 Compliance, even where
strict enforcement exists, is, however, never perfect. Taken on a smaller scale,
there are in each society individuals who break the law. There are other factors
which will influence compliance, such as a government’s monetary and human
resource capacity, the law’s content and language, cooperation among
institutions, and so on. Effectiveness, however, cannot be measured simply by
assessing the goals achieved. The bigger picture must also be taken into
consideration; simply put, is the overall situation better than it would have
been without the Treaty? 210 Moreover, one cannot expect a legal tool to
completely eradicate corruption. Realistically, the desired result should be a
change in the behavior of States. 211
A.

Barrier to the UNCAC’s Effectiveness: Compliance Challenges

“[A]greements have value only if the promises exchanged serve to bind the
parties. The agreements are, therefore, more valuable if they can bind the
parties more effectively.” 212
Enforcement is a major hurdle in international law. It is generally very
difficult to convince a group of nations to agree to have their territorial rights
diminished, even if the long-term outcome would be beneficial to all parties.
Multilateral treaties have always been faced with this difficulty, as they are a
product of their negotiators’ will. Once countries do decide to take part in such
208
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a process, not even the largest or most influential States manage to have all of
their demands met. The process is one of compromise and that is precisely
what enables treaties to accommodate diverging interests. Enforcement
problems are often the result of the accommodation of broad scopes of
interests during the negotiations since they often create obligations that are less
strict and more loosely defined. 213
Many factors and causes of State disobedience have been identified by
academics. 214 Although closely linked, each study offers a particular insight
and a different approach. To better understand the challenges to compliance,
three theories will be summarily described in the following paragraphs.
The first theory, illustrated by Haas, endeavors to predict the
probability of compliance with international legal tools. 215 Among the
developed factors are State capacity (political and technical), national concern,
institutional constraints on a domestic level, and the availability of monitoring
mechanisms. 216 No mention is made of the treaty’s language or of issues
relating to jurisdiction. In fact, apart from monitoring mechanisms, the
variables are not particularly dependent on a treaty’s content and are rather
focused on extraneous circumstances, such as the Member States’ economic,
political, and social situation.
Two other authors, Chayes and Chayes, identify three variables that can
explain why treaty obligations are violated: Ambiguities in the language of the
treaty, limitations of the Member State’s capacity, and the “temporal
dimension” of the social and political changes contemplated by international
conventions. 217 This last variable refers to the lapse in time many agreements
face from the moment they are adopted to their implementation. These
elements may be considered causes but are sometimes used as justifications for
infringements. 218 Thus, Chayes and Chayes’ theory gives significant weight to
variables flowing from the treaty itself and unlike the first theory, lists treaty
language as a cause for non-compliance. These factors, however, also consider
external elements to the UNCAC. Interestingly, they do not consider the
absence of a monitoring mechanism to be a threat to compliance.
Lastly, Benvenisti’s study, in our view, is the most detailed and
relevant theory to the UNCAC. Eleven factors affecting compliance are
enumerated, some of which are of particular interest. 219 For instance, the
number of parties to an agreement: the higher the number, the more difficult
the monitoring. This is clearly a problem within the UNCAC: because of the
high number of Member States, a monitoring mechanism was negotiated much
213
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later in November of 2009. 220 Another element is the participation of a higher
number of countries in the agreement: the rationale is that the more actors
participate, the more others will feel compelled to join. 221 There is, however, a
downside: the more members there are to an agreement, the more difficult it is
to monitor and to find common ground. The Member States’ behavior before
engaging in negotiations is also a factor. 222 On this point, it is our view that if a
Member State willingly takes part in an international agreement, modifications
in behavior, however small they might turn out to be, are not only reasonable,
but should be expected. Capacity is another element of importance and is also
a variable figuring in Benvenisti’s list. 223 This refers to a government’s
financial capacity and its human resources, which vary from country to
country. Furthermore, it is essential that leading countries take part in the
negotiation of a convention, as they tend to exert greater influence upon
others. 224 These factors relate to the treaty’s membership, and not necessarily
to the treaty itself. Benvenisti, however, does include criteria relating to an
agreement’s monitoring mechanism, stating that “international secretariats to
the agreements play important roles in promoting compliance.” 225
These theories seem to share the opinion that a treaty’s content does
not, in itself, heighten compliance levels among Member States: The social and
political circumstances of the Member States involved also play an important
part. 226 With respect for this opinion, important treaty or content-related
elements do have a considerable role in ensuring compliance. These elements
include, but are not limited to the treaty’s language, its monitoring mechanism,
and its sanctions. These criteria are discussed in the following paragraphs.
1.

Direct Compliance Challenges

The UNCAC’s language is important in determining its enforceability.
Its monitoring mechanism and sanctions (or lack thereof) are also pivotal in
this respect. We refer to these factors as “direct compliance challenges,” as
these challenges are internal to the UNCAC: They exist as direct consequences
of the treaty’s wording.
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The Treaty’s Language

Compliance can be defined as “an actor’s behavior that conforms to a
treaty’s explicit rules.” 227 It assesses whether the participants’ actions conform
to the treaty. Some experts argue that with regard to most international
agreements, governments negotiate and ratify treaties that they are certain they
can comply with without having to alter their current legislation: “A situation
of high compliance that lacks implementing efforts occurs when the [treaty]
merely codifies the current behavior of a Member State. In such a case,
compliance can be automatic.” 228 This passage clearly illustrates that the utility
of the treaty may be lost. A contrario, the impact of a treaty is palpable when it
breaks new ground by codifying controversial obligations. There is no question
that the UNCAC covers a wide array of requirements that are sure to
necessitate active implementation on the part of many signatories. Problems
may arise, however, in regards to its quality as an enforceable treaty, as well as
the preciseness of the language used to promote effective implementation.
These potential obstacles will be assessed in the present section.
The consensus of the negotiators on the content of the treaty is reflected
in its text, which “constitutes the authentic written expression of their wills.” 229
The following passage illustrates difficulties that can arise from international
treaty interpretation:
For multilateral treaties, the greater the number of negotiating
states, the greater is the need for imaginative and subtle drafting
to satisfy competing interests. The process inevitably produces
much wording which is unclear or ambiguous. Despite the care
lavished on drafting, and accumulated experience, there is no
treaty which cannot raise some question of interpretation. 230
This is clearly the case of the UNCAC as it encompasses a large and
diverse number of Member States whose interests are divergent. Certainly,
when attempting to resolve ambiguities flowing from the text of the UNCAC,
the actual words themselves, the context, purpose and goal of the UNCAC
must all be considered. 231 Indeed, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties states that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 232 If the application of
this provision leaves the meaning unclear, Article 32 can be applied, giving
227
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additional means of interpretation, namely reference to preparatory works of
the treaty and the circumstances surrounding its conclusion. 233
The effectiveness of the UNCAC may face challenges partly because it
attempts to prevent and punish corrupt behavior. Interpretation difficulties tend
to arise in obligations meant to alter and prevent criminal behavior and most
obligations within treaties are meant to affect behavior in some form. 234
The concept of corruption creates enforcement difficulties because of
the lack of consensus for its legal definition. 235 Indeed, experts qualify the
concept as an “expanding and malleable concept” varying over time and
societies. 236 Because of this, the UNCAC’s negotiators agreed that the
UNCAC should not explicitly define corruption, but rather identify the specific
behaviour classified as criminal misconduct. 237 When reading the UNCAC’s
Preamble, one may conclude that the UNCAC ‘s reach is meant to be vast. 238
Ambiguity, however, tends to produce grey zones within which it
becomes difficult to assess what behavior is allowed or prohibited. 239 This is
for example the case of facilitation payments under the UNCAC: 240 It is
unclear whether such transactions are prohibited or not. 241 Considered “bribery
loopholes,” 242 Argandona defines facilitation payments as follows: “[u]nlike
the worst forms of corruption, facilitating payments do not usually involve an
outright injustice on the part of the payer, as she is entitled to what she
requests, but they may lead to a certain moral callousness.” 243 Such payments
are therefore acceptable, in theory, for tasks that would be accomplished with
or without the payment. 244
233
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There are, however, drawbacks to allowing facilitating payments. For
instance, they create a competitive advantage: those not financially able to
offer such payments are unfairly penalized. Furthermore, they distort local
bureaucracies, confuse government employees about what behavior is
permitted, and create accounting difficulties. 245 In the end, “facilitation
payments do not achieve their goals. Instead they increase delays, and become
costs and risks in themselves.” 246 One may infer that because the UNCAC
includes concerns for good governance, facilitation payments should be
considered as “undue advantages.” 247
The United States, however, has taken a different stance, interpreting
the UNCAC’s language as allowing facilitation payments, whereas the United
Kingdom’s legislation states that such payments constitute an offence under
the Anti-Terrorism Act. 248 The position of the United States is understandable
since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 249 allows exceptions for such
payments, which include payments to obtain permits, licenses, or other official
documents. 250 The unequal treatment of such transactions among Member
States will undoubtedly create unequal standards towards companies
conducting business abroad. 251
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, although not defending such
behavior, explains that these types of payments should be dealt with nationally
because they are “minor domestic offences and not ones of an international
nature that, like the larger scale bribing of foreign officials, will distort
international trade.” 252 This subject is still being debated, and the merits of
either allowing facilitation payments or prohibiting them are still unclear.
Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that by refusing to
acknowledge facilitation payments’ legality, the UNCAC was inherently meant
to leave a measure of discretion to the Member States. The second is that there
was no consensus on the matter during negotiations and a broad definition of
245
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corruption was necessary in order to ensure that as many states as possible
would adhere to the UNCAC. 253 It is our view that both factors played a part in
the UNCAC’s lack of a specific provision criminalizing facilitation payments.
Another example of ambiguity concerns the concept of undue
advantage. Because it is not specified within the UNCAC, the notion must be
defined locally. This omission is most probably due to the reluctance of the
negotiating states to see their sovereignty infringed upon by a requirement
which might be contrary to local practices. In other words, states feared
“extraterritorial browbeating” 254 and the infringement of their sovereignty.
Critics against harmonizing the notion of “undue advantage” have also
argued that bribery remains a domestic concern and the responsibility of the
victimized state. 255 The variance in individual and national treatments of
bribery, however, is far from optimal.
Extradition and international
cooperation are subject to the dual criminality principle under the UNCAC
(this is also the case with other international and regional anti-corruption
initiatives), and as such, if an offence is not criminalized by both the requesting
and requested states, the extradition and cooperation provisions cannot be
enforced.
Although ambiguity invites interpretation and leads to enforcement
difficulties, detail and precision have their own drawbacks. For instance,
precision does not always allow for evolution or changes in society. It may
also create narrow requirements, omitting unforeseeable elements at the time
of the treaty’s drafting, and thus restricting its scope. 256 This in turn may create
eventual loopholes.
Stating that “far from creating a set of fixed and immutable rights and
duties, treaties may over the course of time mutate with surprising and perhaps
unwelcome results,” 257 Professor Merills exposes situations depicting the
mutability of treaty obligations. One of them concerns developments in
international law that are external to the international instrument. 258 He gives
as an example the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body decision in the
Shrimp/Turtle 259 a 1998 case in which it was decided that current international
253
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concerns must be taken into account when interpreting treaty obligations, as
well as taking into consideration objectives stated in the preamble. 260
The use of broader terms and the absence of specificity within the
UNCAC are justified; these characteristics will allow room to consider
external factors, such as future legal and political developments that might
affect the interpretation of obligations. In the event that such developments
should arise, a broader terminology will ensure that the requirements under the
treaty can adapt over a long period of time and not become obsolete.
Furthermore, disputes between Member States can also be avoided as they are
granted larger latitude to comply with the treaty’s requirements. 261 The maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius summarizes these arguments and may be
translated as “to express one thing is to exclude the other.” 262
Aside from precision, the compulsory nature of the language used is
determinant in instigating State compliance. In other words, both the
vagueness of the terminology and the absence of specific indications as to how
obligations should be enforced are decisive. 263 It is argued that although a
treaty is legally binding, its value can be diminished if lacking specific
indications as to how the parties’ obligations are to be carried out. 264
There are however drawbacks to including precise and mandatory
language in a treaty: it can create legal complexities making implementation
more costly and strenuous. For instance, some argue that the obligations
derived from the UNCAC’s asset recovery chapter are heavy, creating “a
further layer of bureaucracy” 265 and might end up having the opposite effect,
especially in many developing countries where banks are already overloaded
with administrative burdens. 266 It is likely that many developing countries will
lack the capacity to fully implement such demands. There will therefore have
to be a certain level of flexibility in regard to the application of these types of
obligations. Adaptability to social, economic, and political changes is
necessary. 267 If one is to follow this opinion, it can be argued that including
detailed and precise enforcement provisions may not be the best solution, as
they may not be able to adapt to the changing and evolving needs of anticorruption legislation and leave little room for unilateral interpretation.
The absence of definitions and the resulting ambiguity in the text allow
for a broader interpretation of the UNCAC. The manner in which a State will
interpret a given obligation is closely if not inextricably linked to its cultural
practices and domestic legal system, which determines how it will implement
the treaty. Monitoring mechanisms may therefore be necessary in order to
257, at 95.
260
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261
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ensure compliance, whether through recommendations, oversight
commissions, and sanctions. These review challenges are examined in the
following sections.
b.

Monitoring Mechanism and Implementation

In order to ensure a country’s commitment to the UNCAC, a review
mechanism is essential for monitoring implementation: “Anything less would
undermine the credibility of UNCAC.” 268 The goal of monitoring provisions is
to encourage countries to ratify conventions and to put them into practice. 269
Most of the UNCAC’s provisions are not self-executing and therefore require
national implementation on the part of its Member States. 270 The mechanisms
created to ensure proper domestic implementation are of critical importance in
light of the large and diverse array of participating states. This diversity in the
UNCAC’s membership also makes it more difficult for Member States to reach
a consensus on a monitoring mechanism. 271
The presence of one disobedient state is enough to create an incentive
for other members to disobey the rules. This argument is based on the
assumption that compliance is in part a result of the expectation that all states
will comply. 272 Proper implementation is said to take into account the existing
social, cultural, and economic ‘incentive systems;’
Reform works when it gets the incentives right, that is, when its
design and implementation take into account existing social,
economic, and cultural incentive systems; and works with them
adaptively . . . . [r]eformers must also take into account the
incentives of natural resisters—those who profit from things as
they are—who are likely to oppose, resist, or manipulate
reforms and who somehow often co-opt or neutralise these
parties. 273
The concept of “natural resisters” is quite pertinent in the case of legal
anti-corruption measures in that many individuals already profit from the way
things currently stand. The incentive to allow the status quo to continue and to
refrain from implementing international anti-corruption laws will therefore
probably prove to be a significant problem in many countries. Without a proper
268
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monitoring mechanism, States may decide not to properly implement certain
obligations under the UNCAC.
In addition to the problem that “natural resisters” present for
compliance, the “temporal dimension,” 274 identified by Chayes’ theory as a
factor of non-compliance, should also be underlined. This temporal problem
arises more specifically in regard to instruments dealing with major
international problems and necessitating a considerable timeframe for
implementation. Such treaties invariably require a transitional period between
their adoption and their implementation. The UNCAC without a doubt falls
into this category of treaty, as corruption is a major global problem to be
remedied.
In its final version, Chapter VII of the UNCAC consists of two
provisions covering mechanisms for implementation. 275 Article 63 establishes
a Conference of the States Parties to the Convention (COSP) to “improve the
capacity of and cooperation between States Parties to achieve the objectives set
forth in [the UNCAC] and to promote and review its implementation.” 276 The
UNCAC also states that the COSP will periodically review Member States’
implementation 277 and make necessary recommendations for improvement. 278
The COSP can decide to establish a mechanism or body in order to aid in the
effective implementation, “if it deems it necessary.” 279
The vague terminology used unfortunately recalls the expression lex
simulata, which refers to “a vehicle for sustaining or reinforcing basic civic
tenets, but not for influencing pertinent behavior.” 280 One may sustain the view
that although certain means for enforcing the UNCAC were provided for in its
implementation provisions, they were perhaps not meant to foster immediate
action among states.
During the negotiations, many countries held the position that a
monitoring system should be established. However, the only proposal retained
was that of Austria and the Netherlands, suggesting the adoption of a
Conference of States Parties (Article 63 of the UNCAC). States opposing a
more stringent monitoring system feared it would violate their sovereignty. 281
Other proposals suggesting a subsidiary monitoring body, a regional evaluation
process, and a peer review system including sanctions for non-compliance
were all rejected due to that same fear. 282 Because of the lack of consensus, the
issue was deferred to the COSP to be held one year after the UNCAC’s entry
274
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into force. 283 The COSP’s first session took place in December 2006 at which
time it deferred any decision as to an implementation review mechanism. 284 A
second Conference took place in late January and early February of 2008, 285
which again deferred the matter to its third session, held in Doha in November
2009. 286 The first two sessions, although not bringing about any firm decisions
on the review process, still covered many issues relating to technical
assistance, asset recovery mechanisms, and certain guidelines or principles to
be followed in deciding on a future implementation review mechanism. 287 The
third session finally brought about a much awaited review mechanism.
The UNCAC’s review mechanism is based on an intergovernmental
process and is best described as a “peer review mechanism.” 288 Although the
term has not been officially defined, it has, throughout the years, been given a
specific meaning:
Peer review can be described as the systematic examination and
assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with
the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its
policy making, adopt best practices and comply with
established standards and principles. The examination is
conducted on a non-adversarial basis, and it relies heavily on
mutual trust among the states involved in the review, as well as
their shared confidence in the process. 289
Other types of review mechanisms include self-evaluation and expert
reviews. Self-evaluation occurs when a government is asked to review itself. It
often requires that Member States answer a questionnaire, assessing their own
performance. This method is, in our view, the most lenient of review
283
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mechanisms, as it is not independent or impartial. Expert reviews, on the other
hand, are a more adversarial method, whereby government performance is
assessed by a panel of independent experts who are generally well versed in
the reviewed State’s national law as well as on the applicable agreement. This
process ensures a higher level of independence and expertise than both the
self-evaluation and mutual evaluation processes. 290
Some of the main objectives of the mechanism under the UNCAC are
transparency, impartiality, the absence of ranking among states and the sharing
of good practices. 291 More specifically, its characteristics include a selfassessment checklist, a desk review and dialogue between the reviewer and
reviewed state. The country review is carried out by two other Member States,
one of which must be from the same geographical region as the state under
review. The reviewers, made up of government experts, are chosen on a
random basis by the drawing of lots. However, the reviewed state may request
that different reviewers be drawn and this privilege can be exercised up to two
times within the same review period; exceptionally, this process can be
repeated more than twice. 292 Within the peer review process, country reviews
are deemed as one of the crucial elements and are said to be part of a process
which is formal, systematic, and representative of the entire membership of the
agreement. 293
The self-assessment checklist consists mainly of a questionnaire that
must be filled out by the reviewed state. 294 Each reviewing state appoints
experts for the purpose of the review process. 295 A desk review is then
conducted, which consists of an analysis of the responses given by the
reviewed State in the self-assessment checklist, 296 as well as pertinent
information produced by similar mechanisms under other agreements covering
anti-corruption measures. 297 An on-site visit can follow but only if the
reviewed state agrees to it. 298
An important aspect of any review process is its follow-up procedure.
Within the UNCAC, follow up occurs during the review phase and consists of
290
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an analysis of the progress made in regard to the observations received by the
reviewed state. 299
Finally, a country review report is then created by the reviewing states
and is based on all of the information gathered. It identifies the country’s
challenges, successes, and good practices and contains “observations” for
future implementation. 300 These reports are never published and remain
confidential. 301
The peer review mechanism is said to be an “instrument for formalizing
cooperation,” 302 in that it is not considered a strict monitoring mechanism but
rather a cooperative one. Its effectiveness is said to depend on four factors:
value sharing, commitment, mutual trust, and credibility. Value sharing implies
that the participating countries share similar standards upon which to evaluate
their respective performance. Commitment, on the other hand, refers to the use
of an adequate level of financial and human resources by Member States in the
fulfillment of their obligations. While the mutual trust requirement might seem
self-explanatory, it includes transparency and openness in the sharing of
information and data. Finally, credibility implies complete independence on
the part of the evaluators. 303
There is an added element that is considered as pivotal in the proper
functioning of the peer review process, that of the participation of civil society,
which adds public pressure to the existing peer pressure. 304 The OECD AntiBribery Convention serves as a good example of the possible benefits of civil
society participation, as its monitoring mechanism is qualified as elaborate:
reports and recommendations are made public and private sector and civil
society play an active role throughout each review phase of the convention’s
monitoring mechanism. 305
In our view, the confidentiality of the country reports goes against the
UNCAC’s guiding principles of transparency and impartiality, as well as its
own article 13 that states each member should take measures to promote the
participation of civil society and non-governmental organizations by allowing
the public to contribute to the decision-making process and by ensuring the
public’s access to information. 306 Indeed, before the UNCAC’s mechanism
was adopted, Transparency International suggested that its monitoring
mechanism be as transparent as possible, by implementing a mechanism that
includes the participation of civil society and the private sector: it stated that
“[a] process limited to governments reviewing governments behind closed
299
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doors will have far less public credibility than a more broad-based process and
will be less effective in achieving UNCAC’s basic objective of overcoming
corruption.” 307 It could, however, be argued that confidentiality is necessary in
order to ensure the active participation of Member States. However, secrecy is
said to have resulted in diminished compliance in other regimes, by
highlighting difficulties in the disclosure of information throughout the
evaluation process: 308 “Access to data is essential if . . . representatives are to
evaluate meaningfully the compliance of parties.” 309
Although transparency is listed as one of the main objectives of the
UNCAC’s mechanism, negotiations unfortunately did not give rise to the
participation of civil society or the private sector in the review process. 310
Reviewed states must however consult impartial parties in order to answer the
self-assessment checklist.
Another guiding principle within the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism
is impartiality. 311 In this respect, Transparency International recommends that
longer term funding come from the regular United Nations budget, as opposed
to voluntary contributions, as such contributions might affect state impartiality.
Indeed, they allow the donating governments to exert a measure of control over
the disbursement of funds. 312 Furthermore, voluntary contributions are not
always consistent and may differ from year to year. The Conference of the
States Parties decided to follow this recommendation in part only:
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The requirements of the Mechanism and its secretariat shall be
funded from the regular budget of the United Nations . . . . [t]he
requirements . . . relating . . . to the requested country visits,
the joint meetings at the United Nations Office at Vienna and
the training of experts, shall be funded through voluntary
contributions . . . . 313
It seems that two fundamental principles of the UNCAC, transparency
and impartiality, were watered down during the negotiations of the monitoring
mechanism in order to please the largest number of Member States.
Other obstacles need to be overcome for the mechanism to be most
effective. First, many developing countries are worried that close monitoring
will expose deficiencies that their governments will be unable to adequately
remedy. This is where the UNCAC’s technical assistance provisions become
essential. Article 60 of the UNCAC states that:
States Parties shall, according to their capacity, consider
affording one another the widest measure of technical
assistance, especially for the benefit of developing countries . . .
which will facilitate international cooperation between States
Parties in the areas of extradition and mutual legal assistance. 314
Second, some industrialized members are concerned that the UNCAC’s
monitoring process will duplicate efforts under other regional anti-corruption
conventions. 315 In order to avoid this, proper coordination among the different
agreements is necessary and is provided for in the desk review: the reviewed
participant must expose its efforts based on other anti-corruption initiatives. 316
As the implementation of the UNCAC goes forward, any overlap with other
anti-corruption initiatives can be avoided. 317
It is still widely debated whether it is more advantageous to have less
strict obligations with wider compliance or strict obligations with lower
compliance. 318 Only once the review process has been given some time to
progress will the UNCAC’s long-term benefits and flaws become visible.
c.

Sanctions Towards Member States

The UNCAC is devoid of sanctions (military or monetary) and does not
penalize its Member States for non-compliance. There is, however,
considerable debate as to the necessity and benefits of sanctions in fostering
313
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compliance with international treaties. 319 In fact, it is argued that emphasis
should be placed on cooperative instead of punitive tactics. The following
passage explains this position:
[A]n emphasis on compliance may point towards a backwardslooking and essentially legalistic approach focusing on state
‘misbehaviour,’ rather than towards a productive enquiry into
devising and deploying better normative techniques and
arrangements that facilitate more effective international dealings
and cooperation. 320
If one were to compare national enforcement systems with that at the
international level, the latter might disappoint the unsuspecting eye. A closer
look, however, reveals that the two mechanisms do not affect the same players:
The reign of sovereignty among countries inevitably means that international
rules are almost always created through a consensual rather than adversarial
process. 321 According to one author, this fact creates a perpetual conundrum,
as the state must negotiate between its desire to assure itself enough latitude for
its own compliance and its desire for predictability in other states’ behavior. 322
This reality can perhaps serve to explain in part why the UNCAC does not
include sanctions.
There are further arguments positing that sanctions (in either an
economic 323 or military form) are not necessarily beneficial to a treaty’s
implementation or sustained enforcement. This is due in part to financial
constraints: repeated sanctions may be costly over time and diminish
legitimacy. 324 The following passage illustrates this reality:
The costs of economic sanctions are also high, not only for the
state against which they are directed, where sanctions fall mainly
on the weakest and most vulnerable, but also for the sanctioning
states. When economic sanctions are used, they tend to be leaky.
Results are slow and not particularly conducive to changing
behaviour. The most important cost, however, is less obvious. It
is the serious political investment required to mobilize and
maintain a concerted military or economic effort over time in a
system without any recognized or acknowledged hierarchically
superior authority. 325
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Another opinion suggests that cooperative enforcement models do not
exclude the application of sanctions, but that they may in fact complement one
another. The success of the cooperation-based model would be enhanced by
the mere fear or threat of sanctions. 326 It is also argued that military and
economic sanctions or fines are rarely invoked due to the high risk of failure:
the “membership dilemma” 327 posits that the failure to impose sanctions on the
non-abiding member is a sign of acceptance of the prohibited behavior.
Expulsion, on the other hand, cuts off cooperation completely, allowing the
member to act freely. 328 These possibilities, however, represent extreme
measures, whereas monetary sanctions are a more moderate solution. The
downside with monetary sanctions is that poorer states might not be able to pay
the sanction, whereas richer states might not be deterred. It can therefore be
argued that monetary sanctions and member expulsion are not beneficial in
fostering state compliance and negatively impact the more vulnerable states.
Another argument downplaying the importance of economic or military
sanctions is related to the concern a state has over its reputation. The following
author believes that a country’s reputation within a treaty regime affects its
behavior: “Even in situations with considerable incentives to defect and
unavailable reciprocal and institutional sanctions, the prospect of exclusion
from future agreements and/or having participation in current agreements
discounted suffices to ensure compliance.” 329 Thus, states guilty of noncompliance can face the prospect of a reputation-oriented sanction: “The
parties to an agreement know that reservations, exceptions, escape clauses, and
so on capture only some of the possible future situations. They recognize that
there is a risk that they will violate a commitment, and that this may generate a
loss of reputation.” 330
One of the benefits of this type of sanction is that it affects states more
equally. Wealthier states are normally better able to answer to economic or
military sanctions, whereas no state is sheltered when it comes to its
reputation. However, the reputation of poorer Member States might suffer due
to their lower compliance rate as a result of their developing economies. 331
There are different theories concerning a state’s reputation. A more
traditional theory suggests that a state has a single reputation, making less
financially stable states more vulnerable to being typecast as noncooperative. 332 However, another theory posits that any given state has a
different reputation for each of its different regimes. 333 This multiple
reputation-based theory is less penalizing, as it allows weaker developing
states to be perceived as non-compliant in one regime, and compliant in
326
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another. Guzman’s theory regarding reputation-oriented sanctions suggests that
the impact that a violation might have on a state’s reputation must be
contextualized on a case-by-case basis:
It seems clear that the reputational impact of a violation of
international law varies depending on the nature of the
violation. For example, a failure to comply with a minor
international obligation that is a result of oversight or human
error and that is promptly corrected without damage to other
states is unlikely to have a major reputational impact. In
contrast, an egregious and intentional violation, such as support
of terrorist activities against another state, is likely to have a
profound impact on a nation’s reputation. . . . [A] list of factors
that influence the reputational impact of a violation, therefore,
should include (1) the severity of the violation; (2) the reasons
for the violation; (3) the extent to which other states know of
the violation; and (4) the clarity of the commitment and the
violation. 334
It can be argued that one of the main goals of law is to affect behavior,
whether in individuals or international actors. 335 This behavioral change is also
considered essential in creating effective conventions. 336 Although the
UNCAC does not provide for economic or military sanctions, Member States
cannot escape their reputation. Therefore, there is in fact an important
incentive for them to comply with their obligations: the perception of society
and their peers.
2.

Indirect Compliance Challenges

“Indirect compliance challenges,” refers to external factors to the
UNCAC, meaning difficulties that arise not from the UNCAC’s wording or
content, but from elements that exist independently and cannot easily be, if at
all, modified; such as the absence of good governance in some countries and
the inherent nature of the offences covered by the UNCAC.

334

Guzman, supra note 226, at 1861.
See id. at 51; see also Haas, supra note 207, at 67.
336
See Guzman, supra note 226, at 51. This author stipulates that behavioral change
requires three conditions. First, the agreement must have substantive content governing the
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Good Governance

The greatest challenges in combating corruption are mostly related to
good governance. 337 Good governance is a broad notion that has many
meanings, one of which defines it as the proper functioning of governmental
machinery. 338 Another specifies that it can be measured using three main
criteria: the nature of a state’s political regime, the process by which economic
and social resources are managed, and the ability of the state to prepare and
apply economic policy. 339 A more normative description illustrates governance
as “the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing
the legitimacy of the public realm.” 340
Strong existing domestic institutions are considered an obvious
requirement of good governance. 341 Their importance in fostering compliance
is apparent when considering the work of Hathaway:
[S]trong domestic institutions are essential not only to domestic
rule of law, but also to international rule of law. Where
international bodies are less active in enforcement of treaty
commitments . . . it falls to domestic institutions to fill the gap.
In some states, this reliance on domestic institutions is
effective. In others it is less so. In democratic nations, where
domestic rule of law and hence enforcement tend to be
relatively strong (because the judiciary, media, and political
parties are free to operate independent of the executive), states
are more likely to abide by international law whether it is
externally enforced or not. In less democratic nations, where
domestic enforcement can be less effective, states are less likely
to abide by international law that is not enforced by
transnational bodies. 342
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TIERS MONDE 165, 167 (2000) (Fr.).
340
Id.
341
See Karim Dahou, La bonne gouvernance selon la Banque mondiale: au-delà de
l’habillage juridique, in MARC TOTTÉ ET. AL. EDS., LA DÉCENTRALISATION EN AFRIQUE DE
L’OUEST 58 (Éditions Karthala 2003) (Fr.).
342
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 520 (2005).

144

145

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

According to the World Bank, transparency is a core component of
good governance 343 and includes many facets, such as the “public disclosure of
assets and incomes of candidates running for public office . . . public
disclosure of political campaign contributions,” 344 campaign expenditures and
“public disclosure of all parliamentary votes, draft legislation and
parliamentary debates.” 345 The following paragraphs attempt to assess this
specific aspect of transparency that we consider particularly relevant to the
persisting lacuna in multilateral anti-corruption agreements: that of political
party financing. 346
Political parties should arise independently from the state as an answer
to the will of societies. 347 It is therefore imperative that they remain free of
government influence as the voice of the people. The rationale for limiting
political party financing is supported by the opinion that “transparency has a
curative effect on the process of raising money, and contribution limits
diminish the possibility of corruption.” 348 Other justifications include the fast
growth of competition derived from campaign financing, 349 and the frequent
instances of diversion of funds for personal use, favoritism, and vote
purchasing. 350
During the UNCAC’s negotiations, political corruption, or, more
specifically, the use of illegally obtained funds to finance political parties
caused intense debate. The views of the delegations diverged considerably
regarding the inclusion of a provision incorporated in the Draft Convention 351
entitled “Funding of Political Parties,” which tentatively read as follows:
1. Each State Party shall adopt, maintain and strengthen
measures and regulations concerning the funding of political
parties. Such measures and regulations shall serve:
(a) To prevent conflicts of interest;
(b) To preserve the integrity of democratic political
343

See AHMED SHAFIQUL HUQUE & HABIB ZAFARULLAH, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
GOVERNANCE 270 (2006); see also World Bank, Governance and Development, 7 (May 1,
1992).
344
DANIEL KAUFMANN, WORLD BANK, Myths and Realities of Governance and
Corruption, Global Competitiveness Report 2005–2006, 92 (2005).
345
Id.
346
Neither of the following agreements contains provisions on political party financing:
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, IACAC, and the CLCC. Although the AU Corruption
Convention does contain such provisions, they are far from detailed and simply call on states
to “incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties.” AU Corruption
Convention, supra note 24, art.10).
347
See Antonio Argandona, Political Party Funding and Business Corruption, Res. Paper
No. 458, INSTITUTE OF HIGHER BUSINESS STUDIES, 4 (2002).
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Henning, supra note 71, at 843.
349
See Webb, supra note 37, at 215.
350
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Received from Governments: Austria, France and The Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/AC.261/L.21
(2003).
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structures and processes;
(c) To proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal
and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and
(d) To incorporate the concept of transparency into
funding of political parties by requiring declaration of
donations exceeding a specified limit.
2. Each State Party shall take measures to avoid as far as
possible conflicts of interest owing to simultaneous holding of
elective office and responsibilities in the private sector. 352
A number of delegations however suggested that the provision be
deleted because of the important differences in the State parties’ legal
systems. 353 The provision was eventually removed during the sixth session of
the Ad Hoc Committee. 354 There did, however, remain a shadow of the deleted
offence included in article 7 of the UNCAC which stipulates that:
Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate
legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the
objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the
fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance
transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public
office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties. 355
The final non-mandatory language has been labeled a disappointment
and criticized as “toothless.” 356 Indeed, the revised provision is stripped of its
content, scope, and enforceability. The removal of the more detailed and
stringent provision was, however, deemed necessary to accommodate the
concerns of a substantial number of delegations and to ensure the completion
of the Draft Convention before the fast-approaching deadline. 357 It should be
352

Revised Draft United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 3/Rev.3, art.
10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.3, (March 1–21 2003) (second emphasis added).
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of a similar provision elicited major disappointment for U.S. officials. They believed that
“excluding political party officials would create a huge loophole for foreign countries, which
could then channel illicit payments to party officials rather than government officials.” See
Press Release, Transparency International, U.S. Weakens U.N. Convention by Blocking
Measures Tackling Political Corruption, (Aug. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2003/2003_08_11_us_
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2003).
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noted that no existing multilateral instrument contains detailed provisions on
the funding of political parties and that perhaps attempting to arrive at a global
consensus on this sensitive issue was an unrealistic goal. 358
b.

The Prosecution of Bribery and Bribery Related
Offences

Unlike other crimes, “crimes of corruption are carried out in secret.” 359
As bribery is a consensual act, there is no apparent or direct victim. Indirect
victims are usually not aware that a specific transaction has occurred. 360 Only
incomplete transactions are likely to be reported, unless there is third party
knowledge of the corrupt transaction. Logically, if the transaction is
completed, both parties to it are guilty of a crime, and neither will denounce
the act or want to come forward as a witness. This makes detection of the
crime and its enforcement quite problematic. Furthermore, the low reporting
rate of such crimes may be explained by the fact that complaints are made only
when bribery deals fail to come to fruition. 361 The following passage clearly
demonstrates the difficulties in prosecuting such offences:
Bribery takes place in the shadows. It may never be visible to
anyone but the immediate actors. Where there are hints of
bribery, investigations backed with some form of compulsory
process may be necessary to establish the case that a signatory
is obliged to take action. Finally, even if there is information
available about a specific, possibly illicit payment, a prosecutor
may have good reasons for declining to prosecute the case:
insufficient evidence to meet a criminal conviction standard of
proof, potential cost of the prosecution relative to other
enforcement priorities, etc. 362
Another aspect making prosecuting corruption offences difficult lies in
the inadequacy of procedural and evidentiary laws in many countries. For
instance, many money laundering offences or financial offences are carried out
with the use of computers and advanced software. Developing countries do not
always have the necessary legislation in place to manage the admissibility of
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such evidence before national courts. 363 This is still the case in Nigeria. Even
dating back to 1976, the Nigerian Supreme Court rendered a decision stating
that new means of reproducing bank account information needed to be
considered, referring to computer generated bank statements:
The law cannot be and is not ignorant of modern business
methods and must not shut its eyes to the mysteries of
computer. In modern times reproductions or inscriptions or
ledgers or other documents by mechanical process are common
place and S.37 cannot, therefore, only apply to books of account
so bound and the pages not easily replaced. 364
A further drawback concerns the availability of testimonial evidence.
When witnesses live abroad, obtaining statements or ensuring witness
cooperation is more difficult. This is not a rare occurrence in money laundering
or bribery cases, and without key witnesses the possibility of losing the case at
trial can be high. 365 Even with the arrival of the UNCAC, this scenario is
probable when taking a closer look at its extradition requirements. Article 44
of the UNCAC creates loopholes by subjecting extradition to Member States
domestic laws. 366 Moreover, in cases where extradition is refused, local trials
rarely produce any outcome as a result of the inaccessibility of evidence, such
as witnesses located overseas. 367
Furthermore, the investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes
can become expensive and time-consuming as they may require specialized
forensics in certain areas such as accounting and money laundering. For these
types of offences, local forensic offices are necessary. If countries such as
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom are not equipped with proper
forensic offices, the chances that developing countries might possess the
necessary means are quite slim. 368
The prosecution of transnational crimes is wholly dependent upon
national prosecution. Even with a comprehensive international treaty, it is up to
each Member State to either prosecute locally or to cooperate with its
counterparts. The following passage illustrates the difficulty in effectively
prosecuting transnational organized crime:
363
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But it is this reliance on national action that creates the greatest
obstacle against effective action against transnational organized
crime, and which has created so many safe havens for drug
traffickers, migrant smugglers, money launderers and other
suspects . . . . The opportunities offered by globalization have
enabled sophisticated criminal organizations to take advantage
of the discrepancies in different legal systems and the noncooperative attitude of many nations. 369
These are critical arguments justifying the need for the centralized
prosecution of bribery and bribery-related crimes through the International
Criminal Court (hereafter “ICC”). It is argued that such a step would make
international law enforcement more efficient by providing a further layer or
forum in addition to prosecutions at the national level. 370
Although some might assume that the ICC’s jurisdiction is universal, it
is in fact subsidiary and complementary to national tribunals. 371
The ICC has jurisdiction over a limited number of offences, namely
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. 372
Although the ICC’s jurisdiction initially extended itself to other offences such
as drug trafficking, opposition to including them grew due to several
considerations. Among these was the fear that such an inclusion might
substantially burden the court’s resources and that “sovereignty issues of some
nations might bar prosecution of such offences by an international
authority.” 373
The ICC’s statute would have to be amended in order for it to have
jurisdiction over the offences included in the UNCAC. The following passage
illustrates the difficult task of amending the ICC’s statute to include other
offences: “A review and inclusion is not going to happen soon, and the mere
fact that the ICC’s statute will have to be amended to include such offences
will be a formidable barrier to the ICC ever taking responsibility for them.” 374
Given the previous analysis, it is clear that the UNCAC’s effectiveness
is threatened by its direct and indirect compliance challenges. The next chapter
will attempt to determine the UNCAC’s relevancy by studying competing
multilateral anti-corruption agreements.
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Barriers to the UNCAC’s Relevancy: Existing Anti-Corruption
Initiatives

Relevancy addresses the urgency of the problem tackled by the
UNCAC. It can be assessed in part by studying other similar instruments and
laws already in place, as these, we argue, are in competition with one
another. 375 If the UNCAC is able to tackle more diverse corruption offences
and to incorporate a higher number of players than its counterparts, it can in
our view be qualified as relevant regardless of the already existing anticorruption instruments.
The UNCAC is not the first international instrument to tackle
corruption. It is however argued that it is the most comprehensive anticorruption tool. 376 The following sections will briefly consider previous anticorruption related international and regional agreements by starting with an
overview of the agreement, followed by a brief summary of its monitoring
mechanism.
1.

The OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials
a.

Overview of the Instrument

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999, after
two years of negotiations. 377 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention “marked the
beginning of an international movement based on the premise that all have a
stake in the integrity of the global marketplace deserving the protection of
law.” 378 The United States exerted considerable pressure on its fellow OECD
Member States to bring about their participation in the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention. The United States, up to that period, was the only country to have
made the act of bribing a foreign public official illegal with the adoption of its
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. In fact, the FCPA was used as a model
for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 379 All thirty-four members of the
OECD are party to the 1999 Convention, and as of December 1999, eighteen
members had also enacted their own national anti-bribery laws. 380
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s main requirement is that each
Member State adopt national legislation against the bribery of foreign
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government officials in international business transactions: 381 it therefore deals
strictly with transnational bribery, making it its main punishable offence. The
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is a clear example of an agreement dealing
with the supply-side of bribery only. 382 Its application is therefore limited
when considering that the UNCAC covers both the supply and demand sides of
bribery. The following passage demonstrates that the main goal of the
agreement was to hinder active bribery as opposed to passive bribery: “[t]he
OECD initiative against bribery in international business transactions
developed out of the pledge by industrialized nations . . . to combat the supply
side of bribery. The approach is aimed at reducing the influx of corrupt
payments.” 383
Although it is still unclear whether the UNCAC’s provisions apply to
facilitation payments in practice, it is quite clear that the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention creates an exception allowing such payments when made to lower
level public officials: “[s]mall ‘facilitation’ payments do not constitute
payments made ‘to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage. . . .’
and, accordingly, are also not an offence.” 384
Similar to the UNCAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention does not
provide for any sanctions against offenders, nor does it provide sanctions
against Member States for non-compliance. It leaves the use of sanctions
towards legal persons to the discretion of the parties, stating that among the
sanctions used there should be effective and dissuasive criminal penalties,
including the “deprivation of liberty sufficient to enable effective mutual legal
assistance and extradition.” 385 Moreover, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
contains two provisions that attempt to hinder Member States from trying to
circumvent the goal of the agreement. Firstly, a State must not be influenced
by the potential effect its decisions might have on relations with another
member, nor should it be influenced by national economic interests:
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public
official shall be subject to the applicable rules and principles of
each Party. They shall not be influenced by considerations of
national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations
with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons
involved. 386
381
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Secondly, regarding the issue of a statute of limitations, the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention states that every Member State’s national legislation
must “allow an adequate period of time for the investigation and
prosecution” 387 of all offences. 388
When comparing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the UNCAC,
a few elements stand out. First is the length of the agreements. The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention has a mere seventeen articles, whereas the UNCAC
has over seventy. Second is the number of Parties: the UNCAC has over a
hundred parties, whereas the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has roughly
thirty-five. 389 Although this is in part due to the regional quality of the latter
agreement, it still merits consideration when assessing the universal
characteristic of the conventions. Third, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
does not address asset recovery, a key issue provided for in length by the
UNCAC. However, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s monitoring
mechanism is said to be its distinguishing characteristic. 390
b.

Monitoring Mechanism

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention monitoring mechanism was the
first mechanism to be adopted in the field of anti-corruption and is considered
one of the most vigorous among its counterparts. 391 The OECD has conducted
over 150 investigations from which approximately sixty individuals and
companies have been sanctioned. 392 It contains a questionnaire prepared by the
reviewing states, a mandatory on site visit and a public country review report.
Furthermore, civil society and the private sector play an active part in all
phases of the process. 393
The review process consists of two phases. The first phase focuses on
whether the enacted national legislation is consistent with the OECD AntiBribery Convention’s requirements. The second phase focuses on enforcement
and the Member State’s capacity to prevent, deter and sanction transnational
bribery. 394 In order to create incentives to cooperate with the reviewing
countries and to properly implement the convention requirements, the review
reports include specific recommendations as well as a follow-up mechanism.
The review process is set up so as to allow participants enough time to start
implementing changes in their national regime according to the
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recommendations they receive in each phase. 395 By rendering the results of the
review process public, significant pressure is brought to bare on members to
improve their implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s
obligations.
In practice, the country evaluations are carried out by experts from two
countries who in the first phase will use questionnaires answered by the
reviewed state as well as submitted legal materials. In this phase, the standard
of implementation is evaluated and a report is published on the Internet. In the
second phase, the examined state’s deployed resources and structures are
considered by using once again questionnaires followed by on-site visits. 396
It is safe to conclude that the UNCAC represents a significant step
forward in many respects, for instance by the number of its Member States, its
geographical pull, the wide array of offences it includes (such as the bribery of
a domestic official and bribery in the private sector), its detailed provisions and
the inclusion of detailed asset recovery provisions. However, when comparing
both agreements’ monitoring mechanisms, one must conclude that the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention’s enforcement mechanism is more effective: contrary
to the UNCAC’s monitoring process, the results of the country reviews are
rendered public, a quality that in our view, enhances the process’ transparency
as well as any effect public dishonor might have on the reviewed State’s
behavior.
2.

The Inter-American Convention against Corruption
a.

Overview of the Instrument

The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the
Organization of American States (OAS) in March of 1996, was the first
regional agreement to impose anti-corruption obligations. 397 It became
effective almost exactly a year later and consists of 28 articles with 33 parties
to date. 398 Its approach is qualified as hemispheric due to the region it
covers 399 and it is considered “a compromise between Latin-American
interests in mutual legal assistance and extradition and the North-American
agenda in criminalizing active transnational commercial bribery.” 400
The IACAC’s scope is wider than that of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, also criminalizing transnational bribery in the public and private
sector but including both the supply and demand sides of bribery, as well as
provisions criminalizing illicit enrichment. Furthermore, the IACAC does not
395
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contain any exceptions allowing facilitation payments, but rather criminalizes
“any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise
or advantage.” 401 It also reverses the burden of proof pertaining to cases where
there exists a sudden increase in an official’s assets. In these respects, it rivals
the UNCAC: It does not create any prima facie exception for facilitation
payments and contains provisions that lighten the burden for the prosecution in
certain circumstances. 402 It leaves the criminalization of other corruption
related offences to the discretion of its members by encouraging them to
consider establishing additional offences. 403 Once adopted, these additional
offences become acts of corruption under the IACAC triggering requirements
concerning cooperation with States that have not necessarily criminalized the
same offences. 404 The OAS Convention has other noteworthy provisions
relating to extradition and cooperation:
[T]he convention constitutes the most important inter-American
legal instrument for extraditing those who commit crimes of
corruption [and] in co-operation and assistance among the
states in obtaining evidence and facilitating necessary
procedural acts regarding the investigation or trials of
corruption. 405
Similar to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UNCAC, the
IACAC is devoid of any penalties, 406 and is therefore criticized as being
weak. 407 While the compulsory quality of the language varies within the
IACAC, its key provision on acts of corruption is drafted in mandatory terms:
Article VI specifies all acts of corruption that fall within the
IACAC’s scope. While Article VI does not provide a specific
definition of corruption, it does list a number of ‘acts of
corruption’ that must be criminalized. Article VI condemns
both active and passive bribery, but limits its reach to corrupt
practices by public officials within the State Party’s territorial
boundary. 408
One of its shortcomings is its limited geographical scope, centered on
the western hemisphere. Although this is explained by the fact that the IACAC
remains a regional initiative, accession is open to any other state, not only to
401
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members of the OAS. 409 European Union countries and other important nonWestern nations have therefore no incentive to adhere to the OAS scheme. 410
Furthermore, contrary to the UNCAC, the IACAC does not contain any actual
asset recovery provisions. 411
Finally, no compliance mechanism was initially set up in the
IACAC. 412 Such a mechanism was only subsequently adopted in June of 2001
during the OAS’ thirty-first General Assembly after participants to the
agreement realized that the agreement had a limited chance of success unless a
monitoring process was put into place. 413 The state parties used the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention as a model and adopted a similar procedure based on
peer review. 414
b.

Monitoring Mechanism

The IACAC’s monitoring mechanism is composed of two bodies: the
Conference of the States Parties to the IACAC and the Committee of Experts.
The latter is responsible for the analysis of the implementation of the IACAC
among its members, whereas the COSP reviews the performance of the
Committee. 415 Contrary to the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism, the State
under review can decide to change, and appoint, experts to the Committee. 416
The Committee of Experts reviews the State Party’s performance in multiple
rounds, each round pertaining to an individual provision of the IACAC. 417
An important aspect of the IACAC’s review process is that it is subject
to the public’s scrutiny: country reports are made public at the end of the
review process and civil society can take part in the self-assessment phase.
Furthermore, civil society organizations may submit documents to the experts
carrying out the review in order to ensure that the information available to
them is not biased or purely one-sided. 418 They may also make presentations in
Committee meetings, whether formal or informal. 419 Experts can also decide to
search or to receive any information pertinent to the review process. 420 The
importance of experts using information submitted by third parties is illustrated
409
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in the following passage:
These are some of the reasons why civil society organizations
should keep an appropriate distance from the responsibilities of
their own governments in responding to the questionnaire.
Failing to do so can affect the independence of judgment
expected from non-governmental organizations. In fact, one of
the debates within the Conference of the State parties focused
on how to avoid governments providing unreliable information
on the implementation of the [IACAC]. Logically, a third
party—civil society—could play a role in providing alternative
opinions that could help balance the information and avoid
governments acting softly on each other. 421
On a more practical front, there have been problems with the timeliness
of the review process. The following passage dating back to 2003 criticized the
first stage of the review process and demonstrates a clear lagging in the
mechanism:
This initial phase has demonstrated the need for resources to do
a thorough review of all the parties within a reasonable time.
The original timetable has already slipped . . . . Some countries
will not be reviewed until eight years after the [IACAC] entered
into force. Moreover, this stage of review only examines certain
[IACAC] provisions. As the program is currently organized,
others will not be addressed until 2005. It is urgent that the
process be accelerated if the [IACAC] is to have an impact on
governance in the hemisphere. 422
While the IACAC criminalizes more offences than the OECD AntiBribery Convention, its scope and wider applicability do not compare to that of
the UNCAC. When comparing review mechanisms, one can observe that the
OECD and the IACAC’s mechanisms have an important aspect in common:
they are more transparent than the UNCAC’s review process in that they allow
the participation of the private sector and of non-governmental organizations, a
crucial facet of transparency. Furthermore, the IACAC’s monitoring
mechanism comprises of a COSP and a Committee of Experts. It seems that
the IACAC’s Committee of Experts has quasi-investigatory powers that enable
it to conduct inquiries. Such powers were not provided for in the negotiation of
the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism. Creating such a committee within the
UNCAC’s review process would not only afford the mechanism greater
independence, but would bring it closer to the expert review process (as
opposed to the peer review mechanism), rendering the evaluation process more
421
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adversarial and effective.
3.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime
a.

Overview of the Instrument

The UNCATOC was the United Nations’ first attempt to create a
binding international agreement in the fight against corruption. It was drafted
by a committee composed of 127 states, was adopted in November of 2000 and
has 159 parties. 423 It entered into force three years later with the submission of
the fortieth instrument of ratification, and contains little over twenty articles. 424
Focusing mainly on organized crime, the UNCATOC recognizes that
corruption can be a result of organized criminal activity. It addresses various
transnational criminal offences, such as money laundering, corruption, and
obstruction of justice. 425 The UNCATOC does not address the issue of
corruption in the private sector. Regarding bribery related offences, both the
supply and demand sides are criminalized, and the criminalization of other
forms of corruption is left to the discretion of the Member States. 426 Because
of the UNCATOC’s main concern with organized crime, its cooperation
provisions can only apply to corruption cases if they contain a transnational
component or if they involve an organized criminal group. 427 Unfortunately,
the UNCTOC does not provide for any penalties or sanctions. However, it does
call on Member States to adopt measures enabling the confiscation of proceeds
of crime, as well as their identification, tracing, freezing and seizure. 428
Any rivalry between the UNCTOC and the UNCAC is trivial, because
the UNCTOC was not meant to vastly cover corruption. In fact, during the
negotiations for the UNCTOC, it was understood that the problem of
corruption was so important that a separate agreement should be negotiated in
order for it to be properly addressed. 429 However, because the UNCTOC’s
monitoring mechanism has been widely criticized, its overview against that of
the UNCAC’s is far from trivial.
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Monitoring Mechanism

The UNCTOC’s monitoring mechanism has been deemed too weak in
order to be considered a “fully fledged review mechanism.” 430 It is carried out
by the Conference of States Parties (COSP) to the Convention and consists
mostly of questionnaires. While the COSP has the ability to recommend
improvements to the reviewed Member State, there is, however, no process
allowing for the verification or publicity of country reports. Furthermore, the
mechanism does not provide for any on-site visits.
The UNCTOC’s mechanism suffers from some of the same lacunas as
the UNCAC’s: Civil society is not involved and the evaluations are based on
similar questionnaires or checklists. This is quite interesting as there had been
high hopes that the UNCTOC would rectify many of the UNCAC’s gaps. The
will of the Member States to either carry out their reviews zealously or to
abstain in doing so will be decisive in the new convention’s success. Indeed,
part of the problem with the UNCTOC’s review process was the lack of
participation by its members: the questionnaires based on self-assessments
received a very low response rate. 431
When considering the UNCTOC, it is safe to conclude that the UNCAC
is not at risk of becoming obsolete or without purpose. It was after all
understood at the time of the adoption of the UNCTOC that a separate and
more complete anti-corruption agreement needed to be negotiated in order to
remedy the legislative gaps relating to corruption, and in this respect, the
UNCAC does not disappoint. Counting over seventy articles, it contains
detailed provisions on private sector corruption, detailed asset recovery
measures, and many other bribery related offences, such as trading in
influence, embezzlement, and obstruction of justice. 432 What is disappointing
is that the UNCAC, having adopted a similar review mechanism, does not
seem to have surpassed the UNCTOC in this respect.
4.

The African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption
a.

Overview of the Instrument

The Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC)
was adopted by the African Union in July 2003 after five years of
negotiations. 433 Its main goals are to "promote and develop mechanisms of
prevention, to detect, to punish and to eradicate corruption both in the public as
430
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well as the private sectors.” 434 It therefore criminalizes both public and private
sector corruption, the supply and demand sides of corruption, money
laundering, concealment, as well as illicit enrichment. 435 Similarly to the
UNCAC and the IACAC, the AUCPCC criminalizes the solicitation or
acceptance of “any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift,
favor, promise or advantage,” 436 and does not create any exception allowing
facilitation payments. It contains a total of twenty-eight articles and one of its
main long-term objectives is to strengthen the political and economic
development of the African continent. 437 The AUCPCC counts forty-four state
signatories and thirty-one parties to date.
The AUCPCC does not address corruption offences implicating foreign
public officials or officials of international organizations. Nevertheless, it does
concern public officials or “any other person” as stated in the provision on the
AUCPCC’s scope of application. 438 According to some experts, the meaning
of “any other person” is “exceedingly wide-ranging” and creates confusion: if
the drafters intended to extend corruption offences to the private sector, this
inclusion was unnecessary because Article 11 of the AUCPCC requires that
Member States criminalize similar conduct in the private sector. 439 Therefore,
the term was most likely meant to encompass any person carrying out a public
official’s tasks in order to ensure the provision’s equal application to
temporary employees.
Similar to the previously studied anti-corruption agreements, the
AUCPCC does not include sanctions or penalties. 440 However, all of its
substantive provisions are drafted in mandatory terms. 441 Indeed, Member
States must “undertake to” adopt legislation in order to establish the
AUCPCC’s offences nationally. In this respect, “[t]he African Convention is
comprehensive on paper and is largely phrased in mandatory terms. However,
its expansiveness may actually deter countries from ratifying it.” 442
An important measure in regard to transparency was considered during
the AUCPCC’s drafting: that of political party funding. Although it was a
contentious issue, it was finally inserted and calls on Member States to adopt
local measures prohibiting the use of funds acquired illegally or in a corrupt
manner and used to finance political parties. 443 Moreover, Member States are
required to establish an independent authority or agency in order to combat
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corruption and carry out cooperation among nations when necessary. 444 A
similar provision was initially included in the UNCAC, but was ultimately
removed during negotiations. 445 The importance of such measures in
diminishing corruption cannot be stressed enough: limiting contributions to
political parties lessens the possibilities for corruption, as does transparency in
political financing. 446
b.

Monitoring Mechanism

The AUCPCC establishes a monitoring mechanism, also based on a
peer review process, by creating an advisory board consisting of eleven experts
elected by Member States for a period of two years. 447 These experts are
chosen from a list of people who are deemed as having the highest measure of
integrity, impartiality, and recognized competence in matters relating to the
AUCPCC. 448 As part of its tasks it must “submit a report to the Executive
Council on a regular basis on the progress made by each state party in
complying with the provisions of this Convention.” 449 Member States must
report to the Board on their progress and they must also provide for the
participation of civil society during the monitoring process. The Board
possesses purely advisory powers, meaning it is devoid of any investigatory
authority. 450
The AUCPCC’s success is deemed quite low due to the reluctance of
many African governments to criticize each other. The mechanism has also
faced important financial and technical challenges. 451 Furthermore, the short
mandate of the board of experts is criticized: “[i]ts limited mandate means that
there is little chance for the Advisory Board to translate the norms of the
[AUCPCC] into reality or provide important clarifications of the obligations
imposed by the [AUCPCC].” 452 It is also argued that for the AUCPCC to have
any positive results, the public needs to be more involved in the monitoring
mechanism: “civil society and other pressure groups will have to claim
possession of the monitoring process. By joining forces as coalitions, they can
help ensure its [parties] successfully implement this new treaty.” 453
Another main problem concerns the AUCPCC’s regional limitations.
As is the case with many regional anti-corruption initiatives, neighboring
444
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countries are made to evaluate each other within the review process, which in
this case creates a reluctance to participate. The AUCPCC is however one of
the few multilateral agreements to contain asset recovery measures: Within the
African continent, the scale of illicitly obtained public assets is immense. In
the worst cases, the amounts held in individual foreign accounts amount to
billions of dollars. 454 Unfortunately, these measures under the AUCPCC
address the confiscation of looted funds only, without providing for specific
seizing and freezing measures. 455
One of the UNCAC’s advantages over the AUCPCC is that it allows
for a much larger number and wider diversity of reviewing Member States.
Furthermore, it provides for detailed cooperation and technical assistance
among Member States, detailed asset recovery measures, and provisions
criminalizing a larger number of offences, such as concealment, trading in
influence, embezzlement, abuse of functions and obstruction of justice.
Interestingly, it seems that while the UNCAC and the AUCPCC share similar
qualities—they both deal with bribery in the public and private sectors, supply
and demand-side bribery, bribery related offences, preventive provisions, etc.
—they also share a similar difficulty: The lack of political will in creating an
enforceable implementation system. A first step to remedying this is to
prioritize the participation of civil society organizations in their monitoring
process. 456
5.

The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
a.

Overview of the Instrument

The Council of Europe, consisting today of forty-seven nations,
adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CLCC) in 1999.
Originally, the Council of Europe had planned on drafting a framework
convention containing more general requirements pertaining to corruption.
After realizing that the incorporated principles were drafted using such vague
terminology that it would be practically impossible to implement them in a
formal treaty, they became the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight
Against Corruption. 457 These principles enabled the Council of Europe to start
working on a corruption convention and are the foundation of the CLCC. 458 At
the time of the CLCC’s adoption in 1999, it was considered the broadest
among regional efforts to combat corruption. 459 Cooperation was made easier
454

See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, reprinted in Getting Systems Right:
Governance and Capacity-Building, 3 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 20, 38 (2005).
455
See Bah, supra note 170, at 25.
456
See Sinjela, supra note 434, at 158.
457
See Comm. of Ministers, Resolution (97) 24 on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the
Fight Against Corruption, EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Reply of the Comm. of Ministers, 101st Sess.,
(1997) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
458
See Shihata, supra note 381, at 240.
459
See Pieth, supra note 400, at 537.

161

162

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

among its members due to the tradition of cooperation as well as the smaller
number of participating nations. 460
The CLCC prohibits both the supply and demand sides of bribery in
both the public and private sectors. 461 It also applies to foreign and
international public servants, members of legislatures, judges, domestic public
officials, and members of international organizations. 462 When the CLCC was
adopted, it was the first international agreement to deal with private sector
corruption. 463 Other than bribery, the CLCC incorporates provisions on trading
in influence, money laundering, and account offences. 464 It is compared to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in that it treads “a very thin line between
corruption and acceptable interaction in public administration.” 465 Although its
scope is considered broad, the range of conduct that Member States are
required to criminalize is quite narrow, as most offences are limited to active
and passive bribery. 466 The agreement does not contain any specific measures
pertaining to facilitation payments. However, similar to the UNCAC, one may
infer that such payments are included in the following conduct: “the promising,
offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue
advantage.” 467
The CLCC contains provisions ensuring that Member States provide
sanctions that include the deprivation of liberty and monetary sanctions to
offending individuals. 468 There are however no sanctions or penalties against
Member States to the CLCC for non-compliance. Furthermore, contrary to the
UNCAC, the CLCC’s asset recovery measures are succinct and limited in
scope. Indeed, the provisions simply call on Parties to adopt legislation in
order to “trace, freeze, and seize instrumentalities and proceeds of
corruption,” 469 without anticipating any specific measures.
b.

Monitoring Mechanism

The monitoring process is implemented by the Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO), which uses a peer pressure model combined with
mutual evaluation measures. GRECO was established in order to improve its
members’ capacity to fight corruption and compliance with corruption related
460
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undertakings. 470 It monitors compliance with the CLCC and with the Guiding
Principles. GRECO has forty-seven Member States, including the United
States; membership is open to all members of the Council of Europe and to
non-member states as well.
Ad hoc expert teams are created to evaluate each country with the use
of questionnaires, country visits, evaluation reports and plenary sessions. The
process is made public by publishing the country reports on the Internet. These
reports contain measures that need to be taken by the evaluated Member State
in order to ensure future compliance. In the subsequent evaluation round, a
follow-up procedure assesses whether the measures have been implemented. 471
In less than five years, GRECO managed to issue forty-two country reports. 472
Although mutual legal assistance treaties already exist within the
region, the CLCC also provides for international cooperation measures because
its ratification is open to states outside of the Council of Europe. 473 The
mandatory nature of language used in the Corruption Convention, coupled with
the existing ties among its members, makes this regional agreement attractive.
The UNCAC however benefits from a much higher number of Member States,
criminalizes a higher number of offences, and contains much more detailed
provisions on the recovery of stolen assets. 474 However, once again, the
UNCAC is faced with a multilateral anti-corruption agreement that chose to
arm itself with a public review mechanism.
Having given an overview of existing anti-corruption agreements, the
UNCAC’s relevancy is quite clear in our view: it criminalizes a number of
offences that are much more important and applies to a much higher number of
states than any other multilateral anti-corruption treaty. It also creates a
“normative mechanism” for the recovery of assets, whereas other anticorruption agreements barely broach the subject. 475 Furthermore, unlike other
agreements, the UNCAC contains a chapter devoted entirely to technical
assistance and information exchange. 476 Our main criticism is directed towards
the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism: it seems to fall short compared to
multilateral agreements such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the
IACAC and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention. Indeed, the
public aspect of the UNCAC’s review process is lacking. By making the
country reports available to civil society scrutiny, and by giving the COSP the
authority to verify reported information, the monitoring mechanism would gain
significant value.
Furthermore, the issue of political party funding is also lacking in the
criminalization chapter of the CLCC and is an important aspect of anti470
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corruption measures. For instance, the AUCPCC contains such a measure, by
calling on Member States to adopt measures that “[p]roscribe the use of funds
acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties” 477
and that “[i]ncorporate the principle of transparency into the funding of
political parties.” 478 By incorporating these small changes, the UNCAC might
live up to its high expectations.
CONCLUSION
The need for a global, in-depth corruption convention is obvious when
considering the devastating effects of corruption. To name a few, corruption
diminishes development, increases social inequalities and poverty, and
discredits the rule of law. It also channels criminal activity, such as terrorism,
organized crime, drug and human trafficking, and deters foreign direct
investment by acting as an additional expense or tax for investors. Finally,
corruption diverts government funds away from essential sectors, such as
health and education sectors, and enhances the public’s distrust towards
political and government authorities. 479
The UNCAC attempts to create a universal framework against
corruption and is the first of its kind. It is described as the most detailed,
complex, and broadest international anti-corruption agreement to date. 480
The UNCAC revolutionizes asset recovery in the field of international
law, dedicating a whole chapter to provisions that create mechanisms to
recover stolen funds. 481 In order to be successful, such provisions must be
accompanied by investigatory provisions, preventive recovery provisions such
as the freezing and seizing of funds, and provisions allowing the confiscation
of assets. 482 In addition to considering these aspects, the UNCAC also calls on
Member States to incorporate measures in order to detect criminal activity and
to afford each other the needed cooperation and assistance in investigations. 483
The breadth of the UNCAC is unparalleled, due to the global quality of
the UNCAC and the many offences it covers. Although the use of precise
language is an important component of effective implementation, strict or
narrow definitions are not always beneficial, as they may not be adaptable to
political and social change. The UNCAC, by purposely omitting a precise
definition of corruption, ensures itself a wider and longer applicability. One of
the drawbacks to choosing vague terminology is the uncertainty of its
applicability to certain behavior. 484 Furthermore, the UNCAC’s provisions are
mostly phrased using discretionary terms and lack the use of mandatory
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language. This outcome is unfortunate as it renders the UNCAC “toothless”.
Aside from re-drafting the provisions, we believe that a more adversarial
monitoring mechanism would be sufficient to solve or compensate for this
issue.
The UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism, based on a mutual evaluation or
peer review process, is considered more rigorous than the self evaluation
method, but more lenient than the expert review process. 485 All-in-all, peer
review can be quite effective, especially when it contains an element of public
pressure. This aspect, although lacking within the UNCAC, can be remedied in
the future by namely making country reports available to the public and by
including civil society organizations in the review process. Furthermore, by
giving the UNCAC’s COSP investigatory powers similar to the IACAC’s
Committee of Experts, the review process would acquire a more adversarial
quality.
The specific aspect of good governance that we deemed most relevant
to this study was that of political party financing. Provisions limiting political
financing and ensuring financing transparency are necessary when one
considers the fast growth of competition derived from political party financing,
the diversion of funds for personal use, and vote purchasing. 486 An earlier draft
of the UNCAC contained a provision on the funding of political parties. It was
however deleted during the UNCAC’s negotiation because of important
differences in the legal systems of Member States. 487 This outcome is
disappointing, particularly in light of the AUCPCC’s political party funding
provision. 488 Although the offence is not criminalized in other major anticorruption agreements, the UNCAC had the possibility to do so, and chose not
to. Member States could, in the future, choose to include such a provision by
adding precision to the UNCAC’s public sector measures.
The UNCAC’s relevancy was measured against existing regional and
multilateral anti-corruption initiatives, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, the IACAC, the UNCTOC, the AUCPCC, and the CLCC.
Following the overview of these competing agreements, one may conclude that
the UNCAC is relevant in today’s international legal forum and has many
qualities, such as criminalizing a large number of bribery and bribery related
offences both in the public and private sectors, extensively covering asset
recovery and technical assistance measures, and its number of parties.
However, the UNCAC seems to have failed to fulfill expectations in regards to
its monitoring mechanism. Although having adopted a peer review monitoring
mechanism (which is not the least adversarial form of review method per se),
the UNCAC failed to include three key features which would have given it a
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more independent and transparent quality, namely, the participation of civil
society, ensuring that country review results are made available to the public,
and affording the COSP with any investigatory powers. These three
characteristics are all the more crucial when one considers that an important
number of provisions are phrased in non-mandatory terms and that the
UNCAC is devoid of economic or military sanctions. Without these changes,
we fear that the UNCAC may not foster compliance in any meaningful way.
Nevertheless, the UNCAC is a step forward in the fight against
corruption, as it creates a forum for continued discussions among many
countries around the world. Due to the UNCAC’s recent entry into force, only
time will tell whether it can sustain compliance. There is still a chance for
political and business leaders to act upon their rhetoric.
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